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 ABSTRACT 
 
The relationship between Russia and the United States of America has been a dominant 
feature of the international relations landscape for much of the last century.  Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, this relationship has been significantly altered.  Over the last 
decade, a resurgent Russia has begun to exert its influence on the global stage once again.  
This effort has been characterized by a mixture of traditional “hard power” and a relatively 
new form of “soft power.”  The government of the Russian Federation has developed a broad 
strategy for engaging the rest of the world with the intention of improving the image of 
Russia.  One component of this effort began in 2007 when the Russian-government-owned 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper began to publish a supplemental news section in the 
Washington Post and the Daily Telegraph.  This supplemental news section is now known 
as Russia Beyond the Headlines, and it is published in 26 countries and 16 languages.  The 
purpose of this publication is to engage an elite section of foreign audiences around the 
world, and hopefully influence their mindset as it relates to Russia.  This thesis provides a 
historical background of the Soviet Union and Russian Federation’s efforts at cultivating 
soft power in general, as well as an in-depth study of the content of Russia Beyond the 
Headlines during 2014 in the three domestic US newspapers (the Washington Post, the New 
York Times and the Wall Street Journal).  This study ultimately concludes that the content 
of Russia Beyond the Headlines within the US market is adequately able to achieve its goals 
through a variety of strategies, and that further research is needed to understand the larger 
impact of the Russian Federation’s exercise of soft power in both the United States of 
America and around the world. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, many experts 
around the аorlН НОciНОН tСat tСО SoviОt Union’s succОssor statО, tСО Russian FОНОration, 
no longer had any viable means of competing with the Western world.  In the beginning 
tСis аas cОrtainlв truО.  Russia’s Оconomв аas in tОrriblО sСapО, anН the transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a free market economy was proving to be difficult for most 
if not all countries participating in this process, and this was certainly the case for the 
аorlН’s larРОst countrв bв siгО.  HoаОvОr, tСО bОРinninР oП the 21st century has seen the 
reemergence of Russian power due largely to the rising price of oil and natural gas, which 
Russia has in abundance, along with the stabilization of the political situation under the 
rule of Vladimir V. Putin.   
As a result of this economic and political resurgence, Russia has begun again to 
demand that its interests on the world stage should be respected.  In the last year and half, 
we have seen this geopolitical competition turn hot in Ukraine.  Both sides have openly 
been speaking of the start of a new Cold War.  Opinion polls in Russia and the United 
States have shown tСat botС countriОs’ РОnОral publics СavО ПolloаОН tСОir lОaНОrs on tСО 
march toward a renewed conflict, whether it be cold or hot remains to be seen. 
However, these old tendencies come in a different era.  The world is no longer 
ideologically divided between totalitarian communism and free-market democracy.  The 
world has globalized.  We are more inter-connected today than we ever have been.  It is 
now possible, thanks to the internet and inventions like Skype, to communicate to friends 
and family around the world for little to no cost.  Social networking has provided voices 
for those that were voiceless.  In addition, the rise of new rivals such as the European 
Union, China, and the rest of the BRICS countries has challenged the traditional notion of 
a US-Soviet bipolarity or US unipolarity in international relations. 
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The larger changes in the world have also led to changes in the rivalry between the 
US and Russia.  Perhaps the most notable example of this is that the Russian Federation 
has recently been investing in boosting its soft power/public diplomacy capabilities.  This 
noticeably different strategy in the struggle for influence in the world is one that is not new 
to the US nor much of the Western world.  In fact, the Soviet Union made a few attempts 
at its cultivation, but ultimately these failed due to a variety of factors.  Today, Russia has 
decided to give it another go, and for the last decade, the Russian Federation has funded a 
variety of soft power/public diplomacy initiatives.  Many of these initiatives are rather new 
and have thus gone virtually unstudied, at least in a systematic methodological manner. 
One such soft power/public diplomacy initiative is called Russia Beyond the 
Headlines (RBTH), and this is the focal point for the following thesis.  RBTH is a 
newspaper supplement that is published in 26 countries in 16 different languages, along 
with 22 websites that provide complimentary online content.  RBTH is wholly owned and 
operated by the Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, which is itself wholly owned and operated 
by the Russian government.  The project began in 2007 with supplements being published 
in the Washington Post in the United States of America and the Daily Telegraph in the 
United Kingdom.  This thesis studies the three print supplements published in three 
prestigious newspapers (the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and the New York 
Times) in the United States during 2014.   
The RBTH supplements are geared specifically toward an intellectually and 
culturally elite group of readers.  In this way, the RBTH supplements are uniquely targeted 
toward a group of Americans that are influential in guiding American foreign policy and/or 
business and financial policy.  TСО mission oП RBTH is to bО “a link between Russian 
society and a foreign audience, offering its media platforms for a balanced and professional 
intОrnational НialoРuО.”1 As this is their stated goal and stated audience, it is important to 
understand what the content is that the Russian government is trying to communicate to 
this important demographic.  However, there has been no comprehensive research done 
                                                     
1
 ‘ussia BeǇoŶd The рeadliŶes, ͞CoŵpaŶǇ | ‘ussia BeǇoŶd The рeadliŶes,͟ aĐĐessed JaŶuaƌǇ Ϯϴ, ϮϬ15, 
http://rbth.co.uk/about_us/company. 
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into the content of the RBTH supplements in the United States.  This thesis provides an 
initial overview of the content during a single calendar year.  Furthermore, this thesis 
offers a series of strategies that the author has been able to identify and codify, which 
provide some insight into the tone and goals of the journalists and editors of RBTH.  
  This thesis explores the nature and theories behind soft power and public 
diplomacy, as well as providing a brief historical background of both the general history of 
soft power/public diplomacy around the world, and more specifically, its history in Russia 
and the former Soviet Union.  The heart of this thesis is a systematic analysis of the 
content, structure, and strategies of Russia Beyond the Headlines as a soft power/public 
diplomacy cultivation method during the tumultuous year of 2014. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1 WHAT IS SOFT POWER? 
 
 TСО concОpt oП “СarН poаОr” vs. “soПt poаОr” Сas bОcomО incrОasinРlв prОvalОnt 
within international relations, both in the academic world and in the political realm.  The 
initial tОrm oП “soПt poаОr” as a contrast to a traНitional “СarН poаОr” аas Пirst ОstablisСОН 
by John Nye, Jr.  In a recent TED Talks speech, Nye describes the differences between 
traНitional СarН poаОrs oП “carrots” anН “sticks” anН Сis iНОa oП “soПt poаОr” bв statinР 
“[p]oаОr is simplв tСО abilitв to aППОct otСОrs to РОt the outcomes you want, and you can 
do it in three ways. You can do it with threats of coercion, "sticks," you can do it with 
payments, "carrots," or you can do it by getting others to want what you want. And that 
ability to get others to want what you want, to get the outcomes you want without coercion 
or paвmОnt, is аСat I call soПt poаОr.”2  In tСis sОnsО, “soПt poаОr” is ОssОntiallв a more 
nuanced strategy of achieving a person or a statО’s Рoals, аitСout rОsultinР to outriРСt ПorcО 
bв bullвinР or coОrcion tСrouРС bribОrв.  FurtСОrmorО, NвО НОПinОs “soПt poаОr” as “tСО 
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises 
from the attractiveness oП a countrв’s culturО, political iНОals, anН policiОs. WСОn our 
policiОs arО sООn as lОРitimatО in tСО ОвОs oП otСОrs, our soПt poаОr is ОnСancОН.”3  This 
“attractivОnОss” is kОв to unНОrstanНinР tСО statОН Рoals oП tСО Russian FОНОration anН tСО 
usefulness of Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH).  
                                                     
2
 Films for the Humanities & Sciences (Firm), Films Media Group, and TED Conferences LLC, TEDTalks Joseph 
Nye - Global Power Shifts, electronic resource (video) (Films Media Group, 2012). 
3
 Joseph S Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), x. 
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 NвО also arРuОs tСat “soПt poаОr”, аСОn propОrlв ОmploвОН, ОnricСОs a statО’s 
“СarН poаОr.”  Similarly, “soПt poаОr” tвpicallв maniПОsts itsОlП in НirОct rОlation or 
conflict to “СarН poаОr.” However, Nye argues that “soПt poаОr” is a mОans oП attraction, 
anН tСat “[i]П вou can aНН tСО soПt poаОr oП attraction to вour toolkit, вou can ОconomiгО 
on carrots anН sticks.”4  In other words, by implementing a cohesive strategy of effective 
“soПt poаОr”, a state is able to make its usО oП coОrcion (“carrots”) or possible force 
(“sticks”) all the more meaningful and potent weapons in international diplomacy.  If a 
countrв is ablО to brinР its “СarН” anН “soПt” poаОr into line with each other, then that 
country is able to proНucО a tвpО oП sвmbiosis tСat NвО coins as “smart poаОr.”5   
 TСО НrОam oП “smart poаОr” Пor a nation is not an Оasв onО to acСiОvО accorНinР to 
Nye.  In a recent article for Foreign Policy ОntitlОН “WСat Russia anН CСina Don’t GОt 
About Soft Power,” Nye statОs tСat “[t]СО soПt poаОr oП a countrв rОsts primarilв on tСrОО 
resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it 
lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as 
legitimate and having moral authority). But combining these resources is not always 
Оasв.”6  He goes on to argue that both Russia and China share a fatal flaw in their intended 
“soПt poаОr” stratОРiОs, anН tСat is bОcausО “soПt poаОr” sСoulН bО proНucОН primarily by 
non-governmental actors, which he argues is largely the case in America. He states that 
“РovОrnmОnt propaРanНa is rarОlв crОНiblО. TСО bОst propaРanНa is not propaРanНa.”7  
Despite this critique, both countries continue to employ government-driven “soПt poаОr” 
initiatives.  
 
 
 
                                                     
4
 Joseph “ NǇe, ͞What ChiŶa aŶd ‘ussia DoŶ͛t Get Aďout “oft Poǁeƌ,͟ Foreign Policy, accessed February 16, 
2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power/. 
5
 Films for the Humanities & Sciences (Firm), Films Media Group, and TED Conferences LLC, TEDTalks Joseph 
Nye - Global Power Shifts; NǇe, ͞What ChiŶa aŶd ‘ussia DoŶ͛t Get Aďout “oft Poǁeƌ.͟ 
6
 NǇe, ͞What ChiŶa aŶd ‘ussia DoŶ͛t Get Aďout “oft Poǁeƌ.͟ 
7
 Ibid. 
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2.2 WHO PRODUCES “SOFT POWER”? 
 
 AltСouРС NвО’s crОation oП tСО аorН “soПt poаОr” is onlв a littlО morО tСan a 
quarter of a century old, the underpinning ideals have been in practice for a considerable 
amount of time.  Perhaps tСО bОst ОбamplО oП a statО ОmploвinР “soПt poаОr” stratОРiОs Сas 
been that of the United States of America.  The Declaration of Independence is an 
ОбcОllОnt ОбamplО oП just sucС a usО oП “soПt poаОr.” By making what was essentially a 
simple tax dispute into a lyrically-based diatribe professing the leading Enlightenment 
ideals of the time, American colonists were able to curry favor among the great powers in 
Europe, and eventually were able to rouse French support, which proved crucial in the 
eventual colonial victory.  I am not arguing that one led directly to the other, but there is no 
НОnвinР tСat JОППОrson’s rСОtoric plaвОН a rolО in currвinР Пavor аitС FrancО anН EuropО.  
The ideals expressed in the declaration have since become a cornerstone of the American 
“iНОntitв”, anН tСОir usО anН tСО subsОquОnt aННitions to tСОm СavО sОrvОН ovОr tСО вОars to 
bО poаОrПul propaРanНa anН a ПunНamОntal aspОct oП AmОrica’s “soПt poаОr.”  In this 
sОnsО, NвО’s assОrtion tСat “РovОrnmОnt propaРanНa is rarОlв crОНiblО” should be taken 
with a grain of salt.  Government propaganda can be credible if it has been established long 
ОnouРС in a РОnОral narrativО oП a statО’s pОrcОption bв tСО rОst oП tСО аorlН.  
NвО arРuОs tСat “[m]ucС oП AmОrica’s soПt poаОr is proНucОН bв civil society — 
everything from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture — not from 
tСО РovОrnmОnt.”8   This assertion is one that should probably be challenged by more 
scholars, but this is not the appropriate place to do so.  However, it is important to point 
out that the United States’ narrative is strongly reaffirmed by many universities (many of 
which are publicly funded by the government) and a variety of foundations and think tanks 
(largely staffed by former academics from the universities mentioned above or former 
government employees). Furthermore, Hollywood and pop culture do a tremendous job of 
                                                     
8
 Ibid. 
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instilling fierce patriotism and scenes of unbelievable grandeur relating to a mythologized 
America, and its history, politics, and cultural superiority.  This sort of all-encompassing 
patriotism and often blind retelling of propaganda should be studied more carefully before 
statОmОnts sucС as NвО’s arО takОn at ПacО valuО.  Again this is not the place to discuss this 
further, but the point is tСat аСo crОatОs “soПt poаОr” is vОrв rarОlв an entity entirely 
separated from tСО РovОrnmОnt tСat it is supportinР.  IП “smart poаОr” comОs Пrom tСО 
sвmbiotic rОlationsСip bОtаООn “СarН” anН “soПt” poаОr, tСОn it must stand to reason that 
their relationship is closer than simply a government and an “inНОpОnНОnt” civil sociОtв 
which explicitly supports the decisions and grandeur of that government. 
AРain, tСis is not tСО placО Пor a НООpОr Нiscussion oП AmОrican “soПt poаОr,” but I 
bring it up simply to point out tСat tСО rОlationsСip bОtаООn РovОrnmОnt anН “soПt poаОr” 
is closer than sometimes perceived, and that is certainly the case for Russia, although I 
аoulН arРuО tСat tСОв arО not alonО in tСis stratОРв or sвstОm oП proНucinР “soПt poаОr” 
throughout tСО аorlН.  In otСОr аorНs, tСО proНuction oП “soПt poаОr” in conjunction аitС 
government is the norm, instead of the exception.  However, I argue that the perception of 
tСО sОparation can anН sСoulН bО sООn as a part oП a “soПt poаОr” narrativО.  In Пact, the lack 
oП a pОrcОption oП sОparation bОtаООn РovОrnmОnt anН an “inНОpОnНОnt” civil sociОtв СavО 
bООn tСО impОtus Пor Russia’s proРram oП “soПt poаОr” promotion. However, that will be 
dealt with a little later in this chapter. 
Indeed, other scholars have arРuОН aРainst NвО’s assОrtion tСat soПt poаОr is 
sОparatО Пrom tСО РovОrnmОnt.  ВinР Fan arРuОs tСat a bОttОr intОrprОtation oП “soПt poаОr” 
is tСat oП “cultural poаОr” tСat comОs НirОctlв Пrom core values and domestic institutions, 
which are not separatО sourcОs oП “cultural poаОr,” but in Пact tСОв arО ОssОntial parts oП a 
sociОtв’s culturО.9  Fan goes on to argue that these core values and domestic institutions are 
fundamentally shaped by the policies and actions of the government.10  In essence, Fan 
arРuОs tСat manв oП tСОsО “inНОpОnНОnt” sourcОs oП “soПt poаОr” crОatО “potОntial soПt 
poаОr,” аСicС tСО РovОrnmОnt tСОn sОlОcts tСosО piОcОs oП “potОntial soПt poаОr” tСat Пit in 
                                                     
9
 YiŶg FaŶ, ͞“oft Poǁeƌ: Poǁeƌ of AttƌaĐtioŶ oƌ CoŶfusioŶ?,͟ Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 4, no. 2 
(May 2008): 4, doi:10.1057/pb.2008.4. 
10
 Ibid., 4–5. 
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аitС its policiОs, anН usО tСОm.  As a rОsult, tСО “potОntial soПt poаОr” proНuced by these 
“inНОpОnНОnt” aРОnts arО in Пact, coopОrativО аitС (iП not rОliant on) tСО support anН 
continued use of their products, which means that the processes of both should not be 
considered separate.  
 
 
2.3 HOW IS SOFT POWER IMPLEMENTED? A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN 
THE WEST  
 
 NвО НОПinОs “soПt poаОr” as a tool tСat can bО usОН in orНОr to attract otСОr 
countries to want what you want.  In order to implement this tool, governments often turn 
to аСat is callОН “public Нiplomacв.” TСО US StatО DОpartmОnt’s аОbsitО НОПinОs “[t]СО 
mission of American public diplomacy is to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy 
goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by 
informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the 
relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the 
rest of the world.”11  It goes on to explain that this is achieved by doing a variety of 
activities, which includes communications with international audiences, cultural 
programming, academic grants, educational exchanges, international visitor programs, and 
U.S. Government efforts to confront ideological support for terrorism.”12  In the same vain, 
public diplomacy is defined by Nye, in rОlationsСip to soПt poаОr, as “an instrumОnt tСat 
governments use to mobilize [soft power] resources to communicate and attract the publics 
of other countries rather than mОrОlв tСОir РovОrnmОnts.” 13  In other words, public 
diplomacy is the mechanism by which governments pursue their soft power goals. 
                                                     
11
 Bureau of Public Affaiƌs DepaƌtŵeŶt Of “tate. The OffiĐe of Weďsite MaŶageŵeŶt, ͞UŶdeƌ “eĐƌetaƌǇ foƌ 
PuďliĐ DiploŵaĐǇ aŶd PuďliĐ Affaiƌs,͟ JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬ, ϮϬϬϵ, http://ǁǁǁ.state.goǀ/ƌ/. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Joseph “. NǇe Jƌ., ͞PuďliĐ DiploŵaĐǇ aŶd “oft Poǁeƌ,͟ Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 616 (March 1, 2008): 95. 
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Public diplomacy is not just a policy tool of the United States, and it is not new.  
For centuries, prestige in Europe was determined largely by military and territorially 
strength.  In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the rising tide of nationalism throughout 
Europe began to establish a clear set of parameters for who a people were and who they 
were not.14  As the ideas manifested themselves at home and solidified into a cohesive 
narrative, nations then began to want to promote that narrative beyond their borders.  
During the later portion of the 19th century, with the advent of faster communication, the 
ability for these nation-states to exert their influence in other countries became easier.  In 
1883, after the French loss in the Franco-Prussian War СaН lОПt tСО countrв’s prОstiРО 
damaged, the French government established the Alliance Francaise, which was tasked 
with promoting French lanРuaРО anН litОraturО abroaН, anН soon tСis lОН to tСО “projection 
of French culture abroad [which] bОcamО a siРniПicant componОnt oП FrОncС Нiplomacв.”15  
This tactic was soon established around the rest of the continent and in the United States.  
In fact, during the early years of World War I, the British and the Germans actively used 
their soft power resources to attempt to persuade the Americans to join the war on their 
side.16 
Soft power continued to be used and fostered for years after the First World War.  
During the interwar period, the invention of the radio allowed for easier dispersal of what 
was little more than governmental propaganda to be spread to all reaches of the Earth by 
most European powers along with the United States.17 After the outbreak of the war, the 
US expanded its operations even further and what bОcamО knoаn as tСО “VoicО oП 
America “moНОlОН [itsОlП] aПtОr tСО BBC, [anН] bв 1943 it СaН tаОntв-three transmitters 
delivering news in twenty-seven languages.” 18   In addition to increasing its presence 
abroad, the United States government also worked to foster support through the use of 
HollваooН Пilms.  TСО OППicО oП WartimО InПormation “аorked to shape Hollywood into 
                                                     
14
 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London; New York: Verso, 1991).  
15
 Richard H Pells, Not like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since 
World War II (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), 31. 
16
 NǇe, ͞PuďliĐ DiploŵaĐǇ aŶd “oft Poǁeƌ,͟ ϵϲ. 
17
 Ibid., 96–97. 
18
 Ibid., 97. 
11 
 
an effective propaganda tool, suggesting additions and deletions to many films and 
denying licenses to others. And Hollywood executives were happy to cooperate out of a 
mixture of patriotism and self-intОrОst.”19  To what extent this cooperation has ceased to 
exist is unknown, but the prevalence of patriotic ideals and sometimes seemingly blatant 
propaganda in many American films indicates that some relationship, whether tacit or 
direct, still exists today. 
As the Cold War began after World War II, the United States increased its soft 
poаОr prОsОncО Нramaticallв across EuropО anН tСО rОst oП tСО WorlН.  “Special radios 
were added such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which used exiles to broadcast 
to the Eastern bloc.”20 Hollywood movies and news media, along with cultural exchanges 
and other aspects of public diplomacy, were used effectively and generously across Europe 
and around the world in order to foster goodwill towards America.  After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and communism in Europe, American efforts did not stop in any of these 
places, or the rest of the world for that matter, but their budgets were cut significantly, and 
would not reemerge until the September 11th tОrrorist attacks anН tСО subsОquОnt “аar on 
terror.”21 
With the advent of the so-called information age, sources of information have 
bОcomО mucС morО аiНОlв availablО, anН tСus, tСО РovОrnmОnt’s abilitв (or anвonО’s for 
that matter) to control information output has become undermined.  The wide variety of 
sources of information has grown exponentially since the internet boom has taken place.  
Traditional media (newspapers, newsreels, etc.) have suffered as a result of this explosion 
of information.  However, the credibility that the traditional media and some governments 
have established remains a vital aspect of the effective use of soft power.  As Nye explains, 
“credibility is the crucial resource and an important source of soft power. Reputation 
becomes even more important than in the past, and political struggles occur over the 
creation and destruction of credibility. Governments compete for credibility not only with 
other governments but with a broad range of alternatives including news media, 
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corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations, 
and networks of scientific communities. Politics has become a contest of competitive 
credibility… Рovernments compete with each other and with other organizations to 
enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their opponents.”22 This competition 
among governments and other activities is at the core of the modern public diplomacy 
“battlОs” tСat raРО around the world.  A primary purpose of this thesis is to look at one of 
tСОsО “battlОs” in particular, anН it takes place on a new battlefield that has only recently 
been created 
 
 
2.4 THE ISSUE OF CREDIBILITY 
 
 As discussed above, credibility is at the heart of any effective use or development 
of soft power.  The variety of different avenues with which Russia has engaged with the 
rest of the world and the United States of America in particular have all faced a variety of 
credibility and propaganda accusations (discussed further in the Empirical Background 
chapter).  The issue of credibility that is important to this thesis is the credibility of the 
RBTH inserts that are featured in The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, and The 
New York Times.  Why does RBTH maintain a sense of credibility?  What makes a 
publication or article credible? 
 In general, the accumulation of credibility, and the maintenance of that credibility, 
can occur in primarily three ways.  First, is the established credibility that a state has built 
up over time, and which is specific to each state, each culture, and truly to each individual 
in much the same way that identity and narratives are understood to occur.  Ben D. Moor 
describes this by saвinР tСat “[i]ndeed, the ubiquity of credibility talk, even across 
cultures, indicates that the process itself of crediting proffered arguments has deep 
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psychological roots, related to the stability of identities and the emergent social order.”23  
The myriad of different influences that affect our perception of the world will influence our 
own perceived idea of the credibility of the source material.  General trends within a 
culture or state can still be gleaned from various methods, such as opinion polls, surveys, 
etc. despite the individual nature that is inherent within the question of perception.  In the 
same vain, the perception of a country and its implementation of soft power cultivation 
techniques (i.e. RBTH, RT, RIANOVOSTI (now Sputnik), Rossotrudnichestvo, etc.) 
comes from the media, NGO analysts, and government officials of the country where these 
activities are undertaken.  This is often understudied because of the sheer volume of 
information, but in general, it can be assumed that with respect to Russia, the United States 
media, NGO analysts, and government officials, along with a wide variety of other 
influence makers (i.e. comedians, TV shows, movies, etc.) portray Russia in a particularly 
negative light, and are often suspicious of the intentions of Russia and Russians in general 
(discussed further in the Empirical Background chapter).  
The second means by which credibility is achieved, is by linking itself to an already 
credible institution.  By doing this, a piece of soft power cultivation can prove fruitful by 
the mere association with the credible source.  This is the case with RBTH, and part of the 
reason for its success (discussed further in the Empirical Background chapter).  In short, 
RBTH has selected three of the most credible and respected newspapers in America to 
attach itself to.  The inserts are meant to look as similar to the actual newspapers as 
possible.  They appear to be just another section of the paper that just happens to be 
focused on Russia.  Although there is a brief description that states that RBTH is not 
affiliated with the newspaper in question, the insert otherwise shows little signs of being 
separate from the rest of the paper.  By attaching itself to the newspaper, RBTH is able to 
gain legitimacy and credibility (not to mention circulation) without any outside influence 
in the editorial process.  This technique is fairly effective, as long as it is done in 
conjunction with the third method. 
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The third method of obtaining and maintaining credibility is through the 
consistency with which an entity conducts itself and presents its information.  Moor 
explains that “[c]onsistency is a strong determinant of credibility (hence the prominence of 
discrepancy charges in discrediting stratОРiОs), anН iП a statО’s aНvocacв is pОrcОivОН as 
incompatible with its foreign policy or military action, its reputation [soft power] and 
public diplomacy suffer.”24  Similarlв, tСis РoОs to tСО СОart oП NвО’s arРumОnt Пor аСв 
governments tend to be ineffective as purveyors of soft power.  Too often, their activities 
are seen as simple propaganda and they can even do damage to a nation’s credibility.  As 
Nye statОs, “[i]nformation that appears to be propaganda may not only be scorned, but it 
may also turn out to be counterproductive if it undermines a country's reputation for 
crОНibilitв.”25  
The final method of obtaining and maintaining credibility is to create at least the 
illusion that the instrument is not simply a tool of the government of the home country.  
Objectivity or at least the perception of some level of objectivity is crucial to the success of 
the soft power cultivation tool.   Objectivity is defined bв MОrriam WОbstОr as “expressing 
or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, 
prejudices, or interpretations.”26  The perception of objectivity is clearly more difficult to 
obtain for a government than it is for an individual or independent organization.  Nye 
Обplains tСis rОlationsСip bв statinР tСat “postmodern publics are generally skeptical of 
authority, and governments are often mistrusted. Thus, it often behooves governments to 
keep in the background and to аork аitС privatО actors.”27   
As I will discuss in greater detail later in this chapter, Russia does not operate in a 
manner similar to that of tСО WОst in tОrms oП РovОrnmОnt’s rolО in soПt poаОr cultivation 
and public diplomacy.  As a result, Russian soft power cultivation attempts inherently face 
skepticism.  In order to combat this natural stigma, the Russian government must attempt 
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to establish its objectivity, and subsequently its credibility, in a different way.  The most 
straight forward way to accomplish this is through self-criticism.  As NвО statОs “it is 
sometimes domestically difficult for the government to support presentation of views that 
are critical of its own policies. Yet such criticism is often the most effective way of 
establishing crОНibilitв.”28  At the very least, the acknowledgment of topics that might be 
banned or taboo in the home county but generally accepted as reasonable topics in the 
receiving country should be discussed in an open and frank manner that would be normal 
for the press of the receiving country to publish.  The nature of soft power cultivation must 
be toward a conversation with the target audience on its level, which Nye explains by 
statinР tСat “[b]в НОПinition, soПt poаОr mОans РОttinР otСОrs to аant tСО samО outcomes 
you want, and that requires an understanding of how they are hearing your messages and 
adapting them accordingly. It is crucial to unНОrstanН tСО tarРОt auНiОncО.”29   
Soft power is fundamentally about seduction.  A state is hoping that through soft 
power cultivation tools a person or group of people will find its image attractive, and thus 
they will be more willing to support the actions of the government, the businesses, and the 
аiНОr aims oП tСis ПorОiРn statО. “PoliciОs tСat appОar as narroаlв sОlП-serving or arrogantly 
prОsОntОН arО likОlв to proСibit ratСОr tСan proНucО soПt poаОr.”30  Instead, the soft power 
cultivation tools must present a credible story that appears to be objective on at least some 
reasonable level, and that speaks directly to the target audience in a clear, concise, logical 
manner that is consistent with the normal dialogue of the medium being used in order to be 
effective.  This thesis will analyze RBTH, and determine whether it is able to accomplish 
these criteria. 
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2.5 RUSSIAN SOFT POWER/PUBLIC DIPLOMACY VS. WESTERN SOFT POWER/PUBLIC 
DIPLOMACY 
 
The perception in Russia of soft power and public diplomacy is slightly different 
from that of its Western counterparts, for a variety of reasons.  Alexey Dolinsky identifies 
a few of these reasons in a recent paper about a roundtable discussion on public diplomacy 
sponsored in June 2012 by the Russian Council for International Affairs.  The first issue 
that he identifies deals with the translation and definition in Russian.  The term as literally 
translatОН mОan “ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɚɹ ɞɢɩɥɨɦɚɬɢɹ” in Russian, anН Пor some time this 
translation was used.  However, this term has a connotation and understanding in Russian 
tСat crОatОН “a НanРОrous conПusion: ОvОn cОrtain ОбpОrts arО convincОН tСat public 
diplomacy is no more than a dialog at the level of non-РovОrnmОnt orРaniгations.”31  As 
discussed above, this leaves out a large chunk of the Western definition of public 
diplomacy.  As a result, tСО morО appropriatО translation sСoulН bО “ɩɭɛɥɢɱɧɚɹ 
ɞɢɩɥɨɦɚɬɢɹ”, аСicС carriОs rouРСlв tСО samО mОaninР anН connotations as tСО English 
term “public diplomacy.”32  Furthermore, the issue of the translation and the definition of 
tСО EnРlisС tОrm “soПt poаОr” in Russian can also be an issue.  As Dolinsky describes it, 
“[t]СО tОrm “soПt poаОr” аas translatОН into Russian in НiППОrОnt аaвs at НiППОrОnt timОs – 
as «ɦɹɝɤɚɹ ɦɨɳɶ» [ɦɹɝɤɚɹ means  “soПt” or “milН” anН ɦɨɳɶ mОans “poаОr” or 
“miРСt”], «ɝɢɛɤɚɹ ɫɢɥɚ» [ɝɢɛɤɚɹ can mОan “soПt” but also “ПlОбiblО” or “supplО”,  and 
ɫɢɥɚ means “ПorcО” “strОnРtС” or “poаОr”] Оtc. Today the most widely used translation is 
«ɦɹɝɤɚɹ ɫɢɥɚ»; СoаОvОr, tСО tОrm «ɜɥɚɫɬɶ» [ɜɥɚɫɬɶ mОans “poаОr”, “autСoritв” or 
“rulО”] – as an ability to make others do what one wants – seems to be closer to the 
oriРinal mОaninР tСan «ɫɢɥɚ».”33 However, much of the early confusion over the dynamics 
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oП tСО litОral namО СavО bООn НiscarНОН as a rОsult oП PrОsiНОnt Putin’s various spООcСОs on 
the subject of soft power and public diplomacy. 
In a speech to Foreign Service officers on July 9, 2012, Putin described his own 
anН tСus Russia’s unНОrstanНinР oП soПt poаОr.  HО statОН “tСat ‘soПt poаОr’ is all about 
promotinР onО’s intОrОsts anН policiОs tСrouРС pОrsuasion anН crОatinР a positivО 
pОrcОption oП onО’s country, based not just on its material achievements but also its 
spiritual anН intОllОctual СОritaРО. Russia’s imaРО abroaН is ПormОН not bв us anН as a 
rОsult it is oПtОn НistortОН anН НoОs not rОПlОct tСО rОal situation in our countrв or Russia’s 
contribution to Рlobal civiliгation, sciОncО anН culturО. Our countrв’s policiОs oПtОn suППОr 
from a one-sided portrayal these days… But our fault lies in our failure to adequately 
explain our position. This is where we have gone wrong.”34  He goes on to point out that 
Russia must promote the use of the Russian language and cultivate assets among Russian 
“compatriots” anН Об-patriots living abroad, who he claims are more willing to help their 
mother country then previously understood. 35   It is here, and in a variety of similar 
speeches and articles like it, that Putin shows his most dramatic and meaningful divergence 
Пrom tСО WОstОrn viОа oП аСat soПt poаОr is anН Сoа it sСoulН bО usОН.  Putin’s viОа oП 
soft power is less about attraction and more about coercion and confrontation.  He certainly 
understands that the promotion of Russian culture, language, etc. can help to provide 
Russia with tangible advancements in politics and economics abroad.  However, he fails to 
take into account the larger nature that Nye has identified as being the three resources that 
a country relies on to establish and increase its soft power. 
OncО aРain, tСО tСrОО rОsourcОs tСat NвО arРuОs arО ПounНationallв vital to a statО’s 
soПt poаОr arО: “[1] its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), [2] its political 
values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and [3] its foreign policies (when 
tСОв arО sООn as lОРitimatО anН СavinР moral autСoritв).”36  Putin clearly understands the 
first of these criteria.  He also understands that Russia must defend the legitimacy of its 
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foreign policies and actively engage in promoting the morality and reasoning behind them.  
HoаОvОr, Putin makОs no mОntion oП tСО importancО oП ОmpСasiгinР Russia’s political 
values except through the justification that the other side is doing the same thing (i.e. two 
wrongs make a right).  In fairness, this type of rationale can stand up to reason, but it rarely 
helps to garner goodwill for either side.  The reasoning behind this omission may be due to 
Russian politics and Western politics having substantially different ideas of how the other 
works and who is correct.  Nevertheless, Putin still sees many of the goals of soft power in 
at least a fairly similar light to that of the West, and this thesis will analyze how one tool of 
Russian soft power adheres to the presumptions of soft power in both the theorized 
Western and the theorized Russian concepts. 
Finally, the Russian notion of soft power, unlike its Western counterparts, is 
essentially propelled and generated primarily by the state itself.  As stated above, Nye 
argues that soft power should be primarily cultivated by non-governmental organizations 
(i.e. the domestic film industry; the domestic, independent news media; independent 
NGOs; etc.).37  However, the nature of Russia is such that the existence of these entities do 
not Обist, arО unНОrПunНОН or НООmОН “unrОliablО” Пor propОr soПt poаОr cultivation.  In 
fact, many of these groups that are separate of the government umbrella in Russia are 
active in undermining the credibility of the Russian government, and thus its ability to 
cultivate and grow the soft power of the state.  As a result, the government has undertaken 
the majority of the burden for this creation of soft power around the world.  However, 
Putin’s regime is mindful of that which it does not necessarily possess.  In its attempt to 
cultivate soft power, the Russian government has funded a variety of media initiatives 
(including RBTH), along with creating and/or funding a variety of NGOs.  These 
institutions claim to opОratО in a mannОr tСat is similar to tСОir WОstОrn “inНОpОnНОnt” 
counterparts.  Whether they accomplish this claim or not is at the heart of this thesis. 
The nature of Russian soft power and public diplomacy can be seen as a 
hybridization of their traditional Western understandings.  The end result is a system of 
government-funded media outlets, NGOs, exchange programs, cultural programs, language 
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schools, etc. that are meant to function in much the same way as their Western 
“inНОpОnНОnt” countОrparts.  TСО iНОa oП objОctivitв in anв Оntitв tСat is attОmptinР to 
utilize public diplomacy is questionable at best.  TСО tОrm “public Нiplomacв” аas itsОlП 
coined by Dean Edmund A. Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in the 
mid-1960s in order to describe this new concept.  Subsequently, he went on to describe 
how the naming of this practice came into being and its relationship with propaganda: 
"Even beyond the organ of the Government set up to handle information about the United 
States and to explain our policies, what is important today is the interaction of groups, 
peoples, and cultures beyond national borders, influencing the way groups and peoples in 
other countries think about foreign affairs, react to our policies, and affect the policies of 
their respective governments.  To connote this activity, we at the Fletcher School tried to 
find a name. I would have liked to call it 'propaganda.' It seemed like the nearest thing in 
the pure interpretation of the word to what we were doing. But 'propaganda' has always a 
pejorative connotation in this country. To describe the whole range of communications, 
information, and propaganda, we hit upon 'public diplomacy'."38  Merriam Webster defines 
“propaРanНa” as “ideas or statements that are often false or exaggerated and that are spread 
in order to help a cause, a political leader, a government, etc.”39  To НisparaРО Russia’s 
hybrid version of public diplomacy as mere propaganda is essentially the pot calling the 
kettle black.   
What then becomes important is the idea of credibility as discussed above.  
Without credibility, no meaningful soft power can be created nor can it be possibly 
implemented.  As such, this thesis will look to examine how RBTH manages (or attempts 
to manage) its credibilitв tСrouРСout tСО coursО oП a вОar аСОrО tСО “proНuct” (Russia) tСat 
it is attempting to sell becomes fairly toxic in the minds of many of its intended readers 
and certainly within the larger context of public opinion in the United States.  Objectivity 
(or the perception of some level of objectivity) remains an important factor in the 
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maintenance of credibility, especially during times of difficulty (as discussed above). The 
audience of RBTH in America is an intelligent, educated audience (discussed further in the 
Empirical Background chapter).  By the very nature of the insert being inside an American 
newspaper, we know that the readers consume some amount of that larger newspaper and 
the version of the news contained within it.  As a result, any instance where the guise of 
objectivity is dropped will prove to be detrimental to the overall effectiveness of the insert 
as a cultivation tool for soft power. The balance between the appearance of objectivity and 
the inherent subjective nature of public diplomacy is at the heart of creating credibility, 
along with maintaining interest in what is being transmitted through whatever the medium 
might be.  Without public interest, the raison d'être for RBTH vanishes. 
 
 
2.6 THEORETICAL SCOPE OF THE THESIS  
 
A key issue involved with studying soft power is the effectiveness of soft power 
cultivation attempts on actual real world changes in policy or perception.  Judging the 
extent with which an attempt at cultivating soft power was influential is complicated by a 
litany of different factors.  These factors have been debated by a wide range of different 
scholars from a variety of different disciplines.  However, for the purpose of this thesis, the 
effectiveness of the implementation is beyond the scope of this study.  This thesis hopes to 
primarily analyze the content of the attempt at cultivating soft power by the Russian 
government.  It is too soon and simply too complicated to properly analyze the effect of 
this attempt on either the readers or on American political, business, or financial concerns.  
However, this thesis does provide a fundamental building block in understanding the 
message that the Russian government wished to be conveyed during a contentious period 
of time.  The compiling and analysis of the content of these messages provides a solid 
basis for further research. 
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3. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
3.1 THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC 
DIPLOMACY 
 
THE INTERWAR YEARS 
 
 During the early years of the Soviet Union (1920s-1930s), cultural ties to the West 
were still fairly strong, and the Communist Part/state apparatus attempted to maintain and 
grow these relationships.  These ties existed in part because of the large number of Russian 
revolutionaries (now Communist Party members) who had spent time in exile in Western 
and Central Europe, and who subsequently spoke the languages and understood the 
cultures, and perhaps most importantly, they still maintained contacts there.40  One of the 
primary benefits of these relationships for the Communist Party/state was the notoriety of 
some of these men, which provided the state with excellent references and fostered an air 
of lОРitimacв Пor manв oП tСО Communist Partв/statО’s Оarlв actions аСОn tСОsО mОn 
would simply lend their support to these actions.41 For this reason, the relationships were 
initially deemed very important to the Communist Party/state, but eventually the 
distinction between internal and external threats resulted in distrust and animosity toward 
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these relationships, especially in the 1930s, when paranoia and purges eliminated many of 
these previously established relationships and the credibility that they embodied.42 
In order to foster, maintain, and grow these and other cultural ties and relationships, 
the Soviet Union in 1925 created tСО “All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with 
Foreign Countries” (ȼɫɟɫɨɸɡɧɨɟ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɨ ɤɭɥɶɬɭɪɧɨɣ ɫɜɹɡɢ ɫ ɡɚɝɪɚɧɢɰɟɣ), which is 
better known as VOKS.43  This organization was responsible for a wide variety of cultural 
affairs both foreign and domestic.  According to Michael David-Fox, “VOKS coorНinatОН 
a vast anН variОРatОН sОt oП rОsponsibilitiОs tСat combinОН “intОrnal” anН “ОбtОrnal” 
concОrns anН activitiОs. AbroaН, it manaРОН tСО “sociОtiОs oП ПriОnНs” of the Soviet Union, 
as the burgeoning number of cultural friendship societies were informally called; gathered 
information on public opinion and intellectual trends; published widely circulated bulletins 
on Soviet cultural life; and supplied the press with information, articles, and photographs. 
At home, it received foreign intellectual visitors and arranged their contacts and tours 
аitСin tСО SoviОt Union; manaРОН cultural, sciОntific, anН book ОбcСanРОs; anН ОnРaРОН 
the domestic intelligentsia for its various activities and publications.”44  The many duties 
encompassed in one large organization were actually the result of a merger between a 
variety of different committees and other organizations that were aimed at providing 
guides and other help to aid workers in the early years of the 1920s with most notable of 
these committees being the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) Commission on Foreign 
Aid.45   
TsIK was led by Olga Davidovna Kameneva, who was the sister of Lev Trotsky 
anН tСО Пirst аiПО oП LОnin’s НОputв LОv KamОnОv, anН sСО ОvОntuallв bОcamО tСО Пirst 
director of VOKS.46   TsIK was tasked with coordinating the activities of foreign aid 
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аorkОrs tСat LОnin’s РovОrnmОnt rОluctantlв accОptОН НurinР tСО Russian Civil War.47  In 
order to effectively do this, Kameneva and TsIK assigned guides to help the aid worker.  
During the Civil War, many of these guides were by necessity not communist and held 
independent opinions due to the fact that they needed to be highly educated and highly 
skilled in foreign languages, and many of them also happened to be Jewish.48  After the 
end of the Civil War and the creation of VOKS, these guides began to face increased 
scrutiny for their ideals and conduct, which eventually led to Kameneva instituting a new 
traininР proРram Пor РuiНОs tСat аoulН Пocus on “political litОracв” in 1927.49   
Over the subsequent years, these guide training programs began to train the tour 
guides not only how to be politically sensitive toward the SoviОt Union’s Рoals, but tСОв 
also ПacОН prОssurО toаarНs “prolОtarianiгation anН “BolsСОviгation” as Нid Soviet 
ОНucation as a аСolО. TСОв аОrО rОnamОН “Communist CoursОs Пor GuiНОs” anН all oП tСО 
fiПtв stuНОnts аОrО Communist Youth League or party members.”50  All of these changes 
camО as a bвproНuct oП “Stalin’s GrОat BrОak,” and these issues mirrored much of the 
political turmoil and paranoia that was characteristic of the late 1920s and 1930s in the 
Soviet Union.51  The leadership of VOKS reflected these changes and the nature of the 
timОs.  DОspitО СОr СusbanН anН brotСОr’s Пalls Пrom poаОr in 1927, KamОneva was able to 
last three more years before she was removed from office in 1930.52  She was replaced by 
an Old Bolshevik named Fedor Nikolaevich Petrov, who had formerly worked in the Main 
Directorate for Scientific, Artistic, Museum, Theatrical, and Literary Institutions and 
Organizations, which was a part of the People's Commissariat for Education, and signaled 
tСО lОaНОrsСip’s intОntion Пor tСО orРaniгation to Пolloа tСО partв linО.53  Petrov lasted until 
1934 when he was replaced by Alexander Arosev, who was a former Ambassador to 
Czechoslovakia and a long-time friend of Vyacheslav Molotov.54  Arosev was arrested in 
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1937 during the early stages of the Great Terror, and then he was replaced by the 
filmmaker Viktor Fedorovich Smirnov, who would remain in charge until 1940.55  The 
chaotic nature of the leadership was clearly reflected in the manner with which the Soviet 
guides they oversaw reacted.  During the course of the 1930s guides increasingly became 
combative and defensive with foreign visitors, and censored themselves and the reports 
that they were required to submit to the secret police on the nature of the questions these 
visitors asked along with their own responses in order to save themselves from scrutiny.56 
Despite these pressures and the all-consuming paranoia of the times, many of these 
ПorОiРn travОlОrs prОsОntОН a “rosв picturО” oП tСО SoviОt Union, аСicС СОlpОН to ПostОr 
goodwill with organizations in their home countries.57  Many of these travelers belong to 
so-callОН “ПОlloа travОlОrs clubs” or to other organizations sympathetic to the Soviet 
Union.  One such organization was the British Society for Cultural Relations between the 
Peoples of the British Commonwealth and the USSR (SCR).  The organization organized 
tours to the Soviet Union and wrote sympathetic articles and pamphlets about the Soviet 
Union and the communist cause.  It also organized other cultural and political events and 
initiatives in London.58  These organizations worked in close coordination with VOKS, but 
the actual nature of this relationship was more a cooperation, and less a direct channel for 
propaganda, according to Emily Lygo.59  LвРo statОs tСat “altСouРС tСО SCR аas a pro-
Soviet organization, its enthusiastic presentation of Soviet culture was not so much the 
result of SoviОt manipulation bОСinН tСО scОnОs as a rОflОction oП tСО ОntСusiasm Пor tСО 
USSR that active members nurtured for a wide variety of reasons.”60  Even during the late 
1930s and the show trials and rumors of the great terror, membership in the club did not 
suffer.61  The SCR would remain a source for positive news about the Soviet Union and its 
developments throughout World War II.62  In contrast, Michael David-Fox argues that the 
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Soviet mindset began to become distorted due to these interactions and that eventually the 
Soviet leadership would see in these writings the notion that the Soviet Union was superior 
to the West, just as many of the fellow travelers in the late 1930s would begin to see the 
Soviet Union as inferior to the West.63  As a result, David-Fox argues that the Soviet 
Union and VOKS adopted a xenophobic stance that was born out of this sense of 
superiority, along with the distrust of foreigners that sprang from the paranoia that was 
central to this period of Soviet history.64 
The nature of the SoviОt Union’s attОmpts at ПostОrinР РooНаill anН soПt poаОr 
during the interwar period were initially somewhat successful, but ultimately their attempts 
would fail due to a few main reasons.  In order to evaluate this, Nye’s statОmОnt (“[t]СО 
soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is 
attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and 
its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority”) 65  must 
be reapplied. In the case of the interwar Soviet Union, its culture was attractive to others, 
but its actions at home and abroad, the projection of its political values and foreign policy, 
did little to foster goodwill or boost Soviet soft power.  The SCR may have stood by the 
Soviet Union despite the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the Great Terror, but much of the 
rest of the left wing in Britain abandoned its support of the Soviet Union because of these 
and other similar actions.66  In addition, many of the fellow travelers eventually turned on 
the Soviet Union, due to the many inconsistencies and failings that they witnessed on the 
ground in the Soviet Union.  In tСО ОnН, tСО IntОrаar SoviОt Union’s attempts at soft power 
failed because of the failurО oП tСО SoviОt Union’s lОaНОrsСip to live up to the ideals that it 
preached, but it was also clearly helped along by the chaotic nature of both the political 
order in Europe at the time and the monumental task of rapid industrialization that was 
underway in the Soviet Union during this period. 
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THE POST-WAR YEARS 
 
 VOKS remained in existence until 1958 when it was replaced by the "Union of 
Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries" (SSOD) 
(ɋɨɸɡ ɫɨɜɟɬɫɤɢɯ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜ ɞɪɭɠɛɵ ɢ ɤɭɥɶɬɭɪɧɨɣ ɫɜɹɡɢ ɫ ɡɚɪɭɛɟɠɧɵɦɢ ɫɬɪɚɧɚɦɢ).67  
During the early years of the Cold War before this transition, there were still some small 
lОvОl oП coopОration anН cultural ОбcСanРО Пor VOKS, incluНinР tСО BolsСoi TСОatОr’s 
ballet company visiting Britain, however, the contentious nature of the early Cold War, 
incluНinР tСО CСurcСill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War, and 
the House Un-American Activities Committee, resulted in the Soviet withdrawal from 
most attempts at cultural exchange with the West and vice versa.68  As a result, the Soviet 
Union focused much of its attention for spreading soft power by looking at its own empire 
and constituent states along with third world countries.  In essence this is what led to the 
change in name and strategy of the SSOD.  According to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 
the SSOD was a: 
union consist[ing] of 63 friendship societies, assigned to deal with various countries, including 12 
socialist countries. It includes the USSR-France, USSR-Great Britain, USSR-Finland, and USSR-
Italy societies, the Society of Soviet-Indian Cultural Relations, and the USSR-Arab Republic of 
Egypt Friendship Society. Other societies include associations for friendship and cultural relations 
with Arab, African, and Latin-American countries, 11 associations and sections for scientists and 
cultural workers, 14 republic societies, and six branches in cities of the RSFSR (Leningrad, 
VolРoРraН, Irkutsk, SocСi, Tol’iatti, anН KСabarovsk). TСО Association for Exchange Between 
SoviОt anН ForОiРn CitiОs is also a mОmbОr oП tСО union. TСО union’s ПriОnНsСip sociОtiОs incluНО 
25,000 enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, educational institutions, and scientific and cultural 
agencies. More than 50 million people participate in the union.69 
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In addition, the union maintained two newspapers (a daily and monthly version) that aimed 
at bringing news of achievements of the Soviet Union to people around the world. 70 
Unfortunately, there has been very little scholarship investigating the activities of these 
organizations and their effectiveness.  However, an issue that must be highlighted is the 
“voluntarв” naturО oП tСОsО “ПriОnНsСip sociОtiОs.” 71 At the heart of this issue from a soft 
power perspective is that these were largely not voluntary friendship societies, and 
although they were possibly intended to mirror Western public diplomacy efforts, they 
were essentially instruments of propaganda.  As such, they received little to no soft power 
benefits from these organizations. 
 The Soviet Union attempted other activities that were aimed at fostering goodwill 
toward the Soviet Union around the world (especially the Third World) like financing 
construction and giving aid.  The construction of the Anwar Dam could be seen as such an 
ОППort, alonР аitС tСО crОation oП a “FriОnНsСip UnivОrsitв” in ConРo.  HoаОvОr, most oП 
these efforts resulted in little noticeable or at least documented changes.  Ultimately, the 
totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union and the corresponding nature of the governments 
that it fostered, left little room for true soft power development.  As Nye puts it, “TСО 
Soviet Union once had a good deal of soft power, but it lost much of it after the invasion of 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Soviet soft power declined even as its hard economic and 
militarв rОsourcОs continuОН to Рroа. BОcausО oП its brutal policiОs, tСО SoviОt Union’s 
СarН poаОr actuallв unНОrcut its soПt poаОr.”72 
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3.2 POST-SOVIET SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ideologically driven entities of the 
SoviОt Union’s ПailОН public Нiplomacв/soПt poаОr ОППort аОrО НisbanНОН.  In tСОir placО, 
the Russian Federation has created a variety of different entities that act in a relatively 
independent fashion from one another.  Each entity has its own goals and financial 
structure.  The main organizations that are focused on public diplomacy and/or soft power 
are Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Valdai International Discussion 
Club, the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, the Russian International Affairs 
Council, the Rossiya Segodnya news agency, the RT news channel, and Russia Beyond the 
Headlines. 
 
ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO 
 
 Rossotrudnichestvo is oППiciallв callОН “the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian 
CoopОration” (Фɟɞɟɪɚɥɶɧɨɟ ɚɝɟɧɬɫɬɜɨ ɩɨ ɞɟɥɚɦ ɋɨɞɪɭɠɟɫɬɜɚ ɇɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɵɯ 
Ƚɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜ, ɫɨɨɬɟɱɟɫɬɜɟɧɧɢɤɨɜ, ɩɪɨɠɢɜɚɸɳɢɯ ɡɚ ɪɭɛɟɠɨɦ, ɢ ɩɨ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɦɭ 
ɝɭɦɚɧɢɬɚɪɧɨɦɭ ɫɨɬɪɭɞɧɢɱɟɫɬɜɭ).  It is a part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
According to article 100 of the 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation, Rossotrudnichestvo “participates in elaborating proposals and implementing 
the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the field of assisting international 
development, providing international humanitarian cooperation, supporting Russian 
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compatriots living abroad, strengthening the position of the Russian language in the world, 
and developing a network of Russian scientific and cultural centers abroad.”73   
Rossotrudnichestvo is tСО oППicial РovОrnmОnt aРОncв taskОН аitС lОaНinР Russia’s 
“public Нiplomacв.”74  AccorНinР to its аОbsitО, “[public Нiplomacв] involves all kinds of 
interactions with civil sociОtв anН ПorОiРn countriОs’ public, РivinР tСО uniquО capacitв Пor 
ОnСancinР tСО statО’s intОrnational rОlations.”75  The website continues by laying out the 
manner with which the organization carries out its public diplomacy mission by stating 
that:  
public diplomacy includes such elements as non-governmental organizations and communities, 
‘twin cities’ contacts, social anН political activitiОs, intОrnational nonРovОrnmОntal orРaniгations… 
Not only the public diplomacy in the international humanitarian cooperation should facilitate the 
further creation of positive image of Russia, but it should also promote the implementation of the 
spОciПic countrв’s intОrОsts.  RossotruНnicСОstvo ПruitПullв coopОratОs аitС sucС non-governmental 
orРaniгations as ‘Russian WorlН’ Fund, Russian Public Chamber, St. Andrew the First-Called 
FounНation, ‘Russian OvОrsОas’ Library Foundation, Russian Culture Fund, International Russian 
Compatriots Fund, Theatre Union of the Russian Federation, International Council of Museums, 
‘Tаin CitiОs’ International Association, Moscow Friendship Communities Fund, St. Petersburg 
International Cooperation Association, etc.76  
Rossotrudnichestvo was created by presidential decree in 2008.  Its main function 
is promoting Russia in the former Soviet Republics, and it has cultural centers in all of the 
former Soviet Republics except for the three Baltic States, which have refused to sign 
agreements with the Russian government that would allow for their establishment. 77  
Rossotrudnichestvo has also expanded around the world with cultural centers in 
Washington DC, Beijing, London, and fifty-siб otСОr locations, alonР аitС “rОpresentative 
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oППicОs” in sОvОntв-seven countries.78  These centers and offices are tasked with promoting 
Russian language and culture, and some are located in embassies and consulates, but most 
are in rented accommodations.79  For all intents and purposes, Rossotrudnichestvo is the 
main driving force behind Russian public diplomacy under the Western definition. 
 
 
THE RUSSKIY MIR FOUNDATION 
 
 The Russkiy Mir Foundation was established by presidential decree in 2007 with 
tСО ОбprОss purposО oП “promoting the Russian language, as Russia's national heritage and 
a significant aspect of Russian and world culture, and supporting Russian language 
teaching programs abroad.”80  The Foundation is a joint project of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science, and according to its website, it is 
funded by both state and private funds.81   The Russkiy Mir Foundation is headed by 
Vyacheslav Nikonov, who is the Dean of History and Political Science at the International 
University in Moscow.  AccorНinР to its аОbsitО, “[t]СО FounНation’s BoarН oП TrustООs 
consists of prominent Russian academics, cultural figures, and distinguished civil 
servants.”82  TСО аОbsitО statОs tСat tСО FounНation is mОant “to promote understanding 
and peace in the world by supporting, enhancing and encouraging the appreciation of 
Russian language, heritage and culture.”83  Similar to Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russkiy Mir 
Foundation has a specific goal designed for “Russian compatriots” outsiНО oП Russia.  
“Russkiy Mir reconnects the Russian community abroad with their homeland, forging new 
and stronger links through cultural and social programs, exchanges and assistance in 
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relocation.”84  The Russkiy Mir Foundation has 83 centers in 41 countries, including 4 in 
Russia, 1 in Washington, D.C. and 1 in New York City.85 
 
 
VALDAI INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION CLUB 
 
 The Valdai International Discussion Club was founded in 2004.  According to the 
club’s аОbsitО, “[t]СО club’s Рoal is to promotО НialoРuО bОtаООn Russian and international 
intellectual elites, and to make an independent, unbiased scientific analysis of political, 
economic and social events in Russia and the rest of the world.”86  The club claims that 
over 800 scholars and other representatives from almost 50 countries, including professors 
at Harvard, Columbia, Georgetown and Stanford, have participated in club activities.87  
The website is vague about the nature of its funding, especially before 2011.  In 2011 a 
non-proПit orРaniгation аas ОstablisСОН in orНОr to ОбpanН “its activities to new areas, 
including research and outreach work, regional and thematic programs.”88  In 2014, the 
website simplв saвs tСat “the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai 
Discussion Club assumОН all rОsponsibilitв Пor tСО club’s projОcts.  
The Foundation was established by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the 
Russian International Affairs Council, the Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations (University) and the National Research University – Higher School of 
Economics.”89  According to its website, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy is an 
independent NGO established in 1992 that works closely with the Russian government and 
is made up of high-ranking public and government officials, heads of business 
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associations, prominent businessmen, the military-industrial complex, academics and 
media representatives. 90   According to its website, the Russian International Affairs 
Council is a non-profit academic and diplomatic think tank that was established in 2010 by 
the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (discussed 
further later in this chapter).91  According to its website, the Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations is a university with a focus on diplomatic training that gives the 
impression of being an independent public university, except for the fact that its board of 
trustees is chaired by Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
and much of the rest of the board are oligarchs and ministers of other government 
ministries.92  Given this, the Institute is at the very least closely tied to the government.  
According to its website, the National Research University – Higher School of Economics 
is a privately created and privately funded university with links to universities across 
Europe.93  TСО scСool НoОs СavО a “supОrvisorв council” tСat is ПillОН аitС РovОrnmОnt 
officials and a few oliРarcСs, but accorНinР to tСО scСool’s аОbsitО, tСО supОrvisorв council 
plays no role in the governance of the university.94   
Despite the obvious attempts to distance the Valdai International Discussion Club 
from a sense of government control, the club clearly has at least close ties with the 
government in a variety of fields.  In addition to the aforementioned links to the funding of 
the club, its annual conferences have been attended by Putin, and he has given a speech at 
each one.  Certainly, the Valdai club should not be considered a simple mouthpiece for 
government propaganda.  The level of international cooperation is impressive, and the 
value of such an organization of academic cooperation is certainly valuable.  However, the 
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club can be viewed essentially as an extension of the wider effort of the Russian Federation 
to cultivate and expand its soft power resources around the globe. 
 
 
ALEXANDER GORCHAKOV PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FUND 
 
 The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund was established in 2010 by 
presidential decree along with the Russian International Affairs Council, which the Fund 
works with in close cooperation.  The council is named after the famous 19th-century 
Russian diplomat Alexander Gorchakov.  According to its website, which is riddled with 
EnРlisС lanРuaРО problОms, tСО FunН is taskОН аitС “ОncouraРinР НОvОlopmОnt oП tСО 
public diplomacy field and supporting establishment of a favorable for Russia public, 
political anН businОss climatО.”95  Essentially, the Fund is involved in supplying aid and 
assistance to all aspects of the Russian public diplomacy effort.  The Fund works with 
media, businesses, NGOs, and any other agency that requires or wishes for its support in 
order to promote themselves to foreign audiences.  Typically, the Fund is involved in 
funding these efforts through grants.  TСО FunН’s boarН oП trustООs is aРain a vОritablО 
аСo’s аСo oП Russian ПorОiРn policв, incluНinР Lavrov anН otСОr РovОrnmОnt ministОrs 
and a variety of oligarchs.96   Furthermore, the partners of the Fund, as listed by the 
website, are the Russian International Affairs Council, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, 
Rossotrudnichestvo, and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
(MGIMO.)97  
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RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL 
 
 The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) was established in 2010 by 
presidential decree along with the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund.  As 
mentioned above, the Russian International Affairs Council is a non-profit academic and 
diplomatic think tank that was established in 2010 by the Ministry of Education and 
Science and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  AccorНinР to its аОbsitО, “RIAC activities 
are aimed at strengthening peace, friendship and solidarity between peoples, preventing 
international conflicts and promoting conflict resolution and crisis settlement.  RIAC 
operates as a link between the state, scholarly community, and civil society in an effort to 
find foreign policy solutions to complex conflict issues.”98  TСО Council’s activitiОs arО 
broken down into Пour catОРoriОs: “research work and international expertise”, “ОНucation 
and enlightenment”, “communication and public activities”, anН “international 
activities.”99   
EacС activitв Сas inНiviНual Рoals anН tasks associatОН аitС it.  “Research work and 
intОrnational ОбpОrtisО” statОs tСat its “aim is to provide analyses and forecasts of global 
risks and opportunities for the benefit of Russian diplomacy, businesses, educational 
centers, public organizations, and their foreign peers.”100  To accomplish this work, the 
Council proviНОs anН carriОs out stuНiОs anН survОвs associatОН аitС “burninР issuОs in 
world politics,” funds academic studies to carry out these studies and analyze them, 
provides pundits with data and analysis, and provides translation services.101  All of this is 
claimed to bО НonО in conjunction аitС tСink tanks.  TСО “ОНucation anН ОnliРСtОnmОnt” 
branch of the Council states that its “aim is to ПacilitatО tСО traininР oП carООr ПorОiРn policв 
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workforce through integration into global educational ОnvironmОnt.”102  To accomplish this 
aim, the Council provides, organizes and funds a variety of educational courses and 
intОrnsСips.  TСО “communication anН public activitiОs” brancС statОs tСat its “aim is to 
ensure interaction between representatives of various professional groups in the context of 
nОа cСallОnРОs anН opportunitiОs ОmОrРinР Пrom moНОrn Рlobal procОssОs.”103  In order to 
accomplish this, the Council facilitates high-level discussions among international political 
leaders and Russian government officials and academics, along with organizing 
conПОrОncОs anН otСОr ОvОnts tСat ПacilitatО sucС intОractions.  TСО “intОrnational activitiОs” 
branch states that its “aim is to crОatО ПavorablО conНitions Пor Russia’s ПastОst intОРration 
into a global worlН bв implОmОntinР multilatОral nОtаork projОcts anН initiativОs.”104  To 
accomplish this, the Council provides assistance in dealing with foreign governments and 
businesses, analyzes foreign counterparts and potential partners, and provides any other 
assistance that might be required to Russian businesses or NGOs.  Overall, the Council is a 
formidable and powerful advocate for all Russian interests in dealing with and 
understanding the situations that exist outside of Russia in order to streamline the process 
of integration and cooperation.  The board of trustees of the council also includes the usual 
members of government and the oligarchy.  The partners of the Council include every 
entity that is discussed in this chapter, as well as many others. 
 
 
ROSSIYA SEGODNYA 
 
 The Rossiya Segodnya news agency was established in December 2013 by 
executive order.105  The creation of Rossiya Segodnya (“Russia Today” in Russian, but that 
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should not be confused with Russia Today, now RT, which is a separate entity) came as the 
result of a merger and/or dissolution of the old RIA Novosti news agency and the Voice of 
Russia radio station, both of which were state-owned.106  Curiously, Rossiya Segodnya 
launched a replacement for RIA Novosti called Sputnik a month before Rossiya Segodnya 
was actually founded.107  In addition, Sputnik Radio was also similarly launched as a 
replacement for the Voice of Russia radio station.108  The two entities work in harmony and 
proНucО contОnt tСat is “entirely geared toward foreign audiences” and is produced in 
many different languages including English and Russian.109 The stated aim of Sputnik is to 
“point tСО аaв to a multipolar аorlН tСat rОspОcts ОvОrв countrв’s national intОrОsts, 
culture, history and traditions.”110  In a different executive order but on the same day, the 
controversial journalist Dmitry Kiselev was named director of the new organization.111 
As a new organization, information is relatively sparse with respect to nearly all 
aspects of its activities, including the content that it produces.  The reasons for its creation 
are unclear as well.  The executive order has little to say on the subject, and not enough 
time has passed for a clear retrospective look at the reasons for its founding.  The 
international media has presented theories on the reason for its creation along with a 
healthy bit of criticism of the organization, its founding, and the new director.  The 
international press reports that the decision was a political one that resulted from a 
conservative faction winning a battle against a liberal element led by former RIA Novosti 
CСiОП EНitor SvОtlana Mironвuk, аСo аantОН to balancО tСО orРaniгation’s covОraРО anН 
gain some level of independence.112  The same media reports contemplate whether the 
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move will lead to increased propaganda and censorship, and criticizing the choice of 
Kiselev as the head of the new organization because of controversial comments and 
stances that he has made over the course of his career.  Although the complete nature and 
role of the new agency largely remain to be seen, its predecessors provide a viable look at 
the possible nature of the agency, which is clearly meant to produce positive news stories 
about Russia. 
RIA Novosti was created in 1941 two days after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet 
Union, by a decree of the USSR’s Council oП PОoplО’s Commissars anН tСО Communist 
Party Central Committee. 113   The decree established the Soviet Information Bureau 
(Sovinformburo) that was responsible for covering news both at home and abroad.114  
During the war, Sovinformburo was responsible for all frontline reporting, and it contained 
a department for propaganda as well.115  After the war, the agency was tasked with being 
the primary voice for the Soviet government abroad, and it was responsible for reporting 
on all aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policy to an international audience.116  In 
1961, the name of the agency was changed to the Novosti Press Agency.117  In 1990, the 
name of the agency was again changed to the Information Agency Novosti, and an 
additional aim was added to its agenda bв tСО НОcrОО tСat statОН tСО aРОncв аas “[t]o 
provide informational support for the USSR's state domestic and foreign policies and 
proceeding from the interests of the democratization of the mass media."118  During most 
of the Soviet period, the organization had bureaus in 120 countries around the world.119  
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new version of the agency was established by the 
Russian government that was based on and incorporated the old structure of the Soviet 
agency.120  During the 1990s, the Agency was expanded to include radio and television 
stations, and in 2005, RIA Novosti, as it was then known, helped to launch the Russia 
Today television network.121 
The Voice of Russia radio station was created in 1929 under the name Radio 
Moscow. 122   For years the station broadcast content in foreign languages, including 
English.  During the Soviet era, the station broadcast materials approved by the Soviet 
government.  In 1993, President Boris Yeltsin reorganized the station and changed its 
name to the Voice of Russia.123  Today, the radio station broadcasts to 160 countries in 38 
languages, including 18 states in the US.124 
 
 
RT 
 
 RT was created in 2005 as Russia Today.  It is a round-the-clock news network that 
is broadcast around the world in more than 100 countries.125  Originally, the network 
broadcasts were solely in English and Russian, but now there are Spanish and Arabic 
broadcasts as well. 126   RT America is broadcast from Washington, DC, and it has 
specialized programs for its American audience.127  In addition to traditional broadcast 
television, RT also has a large focus and presence on the internet, where its YouTube 
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channel was the first to receive a billion views.128   RT has come under considerable 
criticism from the press (discussed further below).  However, the channel has also been 
nominated three times for an International Emmy award in the News category for its 
reporting on the Occupy Wall Street movement and hunger strikes of Guantanamo 
detainees.129  RT states that its mission is to “covОr the major issues of our time for viewers 
wishing to question more and delivers stories often missed by the mainstream media to 
create news with an edge. RT provides an alternative perspective on major global events, 
and acquaints an international audience with the Russian viewpoint.”130  
 
 
3.3 RUSSIA BEYOND THE HEADLINES 
 
 RBTH began to publish inserts in 2007 in the Washington Post and the Daily 
Telegraph. RBTH publishes print supplements (typically on a monthly basis) in 26 
newspapers in 23 countries in 16 different languages, as well as maintaining 19 websites in 
16 different languages that are updated regularly.131  RBTH is a subsidiary of Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, but the editorial staff is separate from Rossiyskaya Gazeta.132  Rossiyskaya Gazeta 
is owned completely by the Russian government, and it serves as the newspaper of record 
for the Russian Federation.133  In America, RBTH now includes supplements in the New 
York Times and the Wall Street Journal.  Initially, the various supplements had different 
names, but as of April 2014, all English language supplements have been callОН “Russia 
Beyond tСО HОaНlinОs.”134 
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RBTH’s statОН mission is to bО “a link between Russian society and a foreign 
audience, offering its media platforms for a balanced and professional international 
dialogue.”135  In order to accomplish this goal, “RBTH collects, selects and publishes in 
foreign languages topical reports about Russian politics, public life, culture, business, 
science, history and other areas that are usually not covered by foreign media for their 
НomОstic auНiОncОs.”136  Most of the articles that RBTH publishes in its supplements are 
done by freelance writers specifically for RBTH, but they also draw from other press 
sources in Russia.137  All articles are edited by RBTH staff who are native speakers, and 
for the print supplements, the articles are further edited by a copy editor hired by the 
partnОr nОаspapОrs in orНОr “to make sure that RBTH material complies with the editorial 
traditions, journalistic standards, rules and other specific features of the partner 
publications. As a rule, these copy editors are not members of the editorial staff of the 
partner newspapers.”138   
RBTH is funded primarily by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, but it also receives some 
funding from sponsorships and commercial advertising.139  RBTH compensates partner 
newspapers for publishing the supplements, as well as for other costs such as promotion of 
the supplements and for studying readership and feedback.140 
As a part of their agreement with RBTH, the partner newspapers are required to do 
sociological and marketing research on the readership of the print supplements.141  These 
studies are meant to assess readers' awareness of the project and feedback on it. 142  
According to the RBTH website, these independent studies consist of 500-600 respondents 
who are asked about how often they read or skim through RBTH, how much time they 
spend reading it, which topics they are most interested in and which topics they would like 
to see covered in future issues, how they view the current state of affairs between their 
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country and Russia, etc.143  RBTH posts some of the results of these studies on its website.  
The results of the surveys for the fourth quarter of 2013 for both the Washington Post and 
the Wall Street Journal are included on the website, but for some unknown reason, no 
results for the survey of its New York Times readers has been posted. 
The two available surveys provide an insight into the readership of these 
supplements.   The results for the Washington Post are as follows: 
RBTH Readership –  
Almost half (46%) of The Washington Post readers have seen the RBTH print supplement in the last 
6 months.  47% of RBTH supplement readers in The Washington Post spend more than 5 minutes 
engaging with it. 
The RBTH Audience (Print) –  
The RBTH audience are regular readers of the quality press and are affluent and well educated.  
They carry authority and impact in the community and demonstrate, through their consumption of 
RBTH, an appetite for objective and varied information about modern Russia.  In the particular case 
of The Washington Post, 55% of RBTH supplement readers are Male, 83% are 35+ aged and 95% 
are educated to degree level or above. 
Positive Evaluation of RBTH in The Washington Post – 
80% of those who read RBTH in print agreed that they would read it again.  Two thirds of RBTH 
audience agree that the articles are well written (66%) and contain new information (67%).  Almost 
three quarters (73%) of The Washington Post supplement readers agree that it is well written.144 
 The results for the Wall Street Journal are as follows (as noted above, before April, 
2014 the RBTH supplement for the Wall Street Journal аas callОН “Russia BusinОss 
InsiРСt”): 
RBTH Readership –  
More than half of WSJ readers (55%) have seen the RBTH print supplement in the last 6 months.  
Two thirds (63%) of supplement audience have read at least two out of three issues of the 
supplement. 
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The RBTH Audience (Print) – 
The Russia Business Insight audience are regular readers of the quality press and are affluent and 
well educated.  They carry authority and impact in the community and demonstrate, through their 
consumption of RBTH, an appetite for objective and varied information about modern Russia.  In 
the particular case of WSJ, 75% of Russia Business Insight supplement readers are Male, 96% are 
35+ aged and 98% are educated to degree level or above. 
Positive Evaluation of RBTH in WSJ – 
Two thirds of Russia Business Insight audience agree that the articles are well written (66%) and 
interesting (67%)  Almost three quarters (72%) of WSJ supplement readers agree that it is easy for 
understanding.  More than half of the The Russia Business Insight audience agree that it analyses 
issues in depth and logically.  Almost half (46%) of the WSJ RBTH audience agree that it is up to 
date with current trends, developments and thinking in their country and globally.145 
 As the studies indicate, the readership of the RBTH supplements in both the 
Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal are substantive.  Both groups tend to be well 
educated.  The Wall Street Journal readers tend to be predominantly male, while the 
Washington Post tends to have a more balanced gender ratio.  In addition, both sets of 
readers tend to have a favorable disposition towards the manner in which the supplements 
are written and the content that is contained within them.  Unfortunately, data about what 
the readers think about the current state of affairs between Russia and the US is not 
available.  Nor is there data from 2014, which could show how the readership and 
perception of the newspapers changed over the course of 2014 at a time of increased 
tensions between Russia and the United States, which would otherwise have been valuable 
for the sake of this thesis.   
The number of readers is sizeable for both publications.  For the Wall Street 
Journal, the readership numbers indicate that the RBTH supplements in 2013 were viewed 
by almost 750,000 people during the past six months based on average daily circulation 
(approximately 1,360,000).146  Out of that group, almost 470,000 readers have read two out 
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of three issues of the supplement.147  The Washington Post has a much smaller circulation 
(377,466) than the Wall Street Journal, but the Post’s RBTH supplement would still have 
had almost 175,000 readers in the last six months.148  Despite having no data from the 
RBTH survey, the New York Times had an average circulation of 639,890 during the 
period of April-September 2013.149  Ultimately, the readership for all publications is fairly 
high, and as the RBTH website states, the audience that it is targeted consists of “political, 
cultural, ОбpОrt, businОss, anН acaНОmic ОlitОs” tСat arО “аОll-educated, well-to-do and 
sociallв activО pОoplО.”150  Thus, one of the central aims of this thesis is to study and 
analyze what messages are being transmitted to this audience. 
 
 
CREDIBILITY OF RBTH 
 
 The two main attempts at reaching an American audience directly through the news 
media (RT and RBTH) are relatively unique and similarly important to this thesis. The 
Russian-government-funded news outlet RT has received its fair share of accusations 
throughout its entire time in existence, including claims of disinformation, biased 
reporting, propaganda, and various other similar claims.151  Although these various claims 
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and issues are not the focus of this thesis, and as such they will not be discussed in depth, 
their existence and persistence is fundamental to the issue of credibility, because the same 
thing cannot be said for the American RBTH supplements, which are the focus of this 
thesis. 
Since its initial inception in 2007, RBTH has received only mild criticism.  The 
early criticism, such as a 2007 article posted in Slate Magazine, which is owned by The 
Washington Post and is the publisher of the RBTH insert, focused on things like poor 
writing style or blanket accusations against the inserts for being propaganda without any 
real examples being cited.152  Later criticism, such as an article from 2012 for the political 
website American Thinker, criticized an RBTH articlО’s covОraРО oП tСО arrest and alleged 
torture of Leonid Razvozzhayev, and the semantics used in its coverage, yet this can be 
seen as more of a disagreement on the style of the reporting and less on its credibility.153  
The other sparse but available criticisms come from opinion pieces in newspapers or 
similar items, such as an article in the Daily Telegraph in 2014 about the Ukrainian crisis, 
аСicС tвpicallв callОН Пor tСО ОnН oП tСО nОаspapОr’s rОlationsСip аitС RBTH НuО to a 
series of policy and other conflicts between Russia and the West.154  As a whole, the 
criticism and complaints lodged against RBTH are far from similar to the accusations 
lobbied against RT.  Instead, the majority of accusations against RBTH can and should be 
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seen as either the stereotyping of lazy journalists/critics, or the run-of-the-mill criticisms 
that any newspaper receives on a regular basis. 
This thesis argues that the RBTH supplements in America have maintained a level 
of credibility for three reasons.  First, these supplements overcame the initial barriers that 
Russian media typically face when attempting to reach an American audience (i.e. 
propaganda claims) by attaching itself to and imitating the style of highly respected 
American newspapers.  Unlike RT, which had to create an entirely new platform that 
аasn’t tiОН to anв traНitional, ОstablisСОН Рroup, tСО RBTH supplОmОnts аОrО ablО to usО 
this aura of respectability to have the targeted audience take the time to read the inserts and 
evaluate them for their own merit.   
Second, the quality and merit of the inserts were and are top notch.  As discussed 
above, by adopting the style of American newspapers, and specifically that of the 
newspaper to which the supplement is attached, allows for the reader to have an intrinsic 
sense of trust based on the familiarity of the writing.  As discussed in the theoretical 
section, soft power analysts agree that in order for a soft power cultivation tool to be 
useful, it must engage the subject audience on its terms and in a manner to which it is 
familiar.155  
Third, the RBTH supplements, while being targeted and typically, systematically 
positive about Russia, are willing and able to criticize aspects of Russian culture, politics, 
society, and economics.  As NвО statОs, “It is somОtimОs НomОsticallв НiППicult Пor tСО 
government to support presentation of views that are critical of its own policies. Yet such 
criticism is oПtОn tСО most ОППОctivО аaв oП ОstablisСinР crОНibilitв.”156  The American 
RBTH supplements certainly heed this advice in a variety of ways (discussed further in the 
data and analysis chapter). 
Ultimately, the RBTH supplements have been able to establish a sustained 
readership by maintaining as close to journalistic integrity as a soft power/public 
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diplomacy tool is able to do.  This is not to discount the fact that the content of these 
supplements has been carefully selected and crafted in order to convey a message directly 
to their intended audiences.  The supplements sometimes share articles or aspects of 
articles with one another; however, each supplement is intended for its own specific 
audience, and it is crafted in order to speak to that particular audience.  This thesis analyzes 
how the various messages that these supplements are conveying grow, change, and interact 
with each other over time.  In addition, this thesis analyzes how these messages interact 
with current events and the devolving relationship between Russia and the US. 
 
 
3.4 PERCEPTION OF ANTI-RUSSIAN BIAS IN AMERICAN MEDIA 
 
 One of the foremost reasons behind the creation of supplements like RBTH is the 
Russian РovОrnmОnt’s belief of tСО AmОrican mОНia’s bias toаarН Russia in its reporting.  
The supplements are certainly soft power/public diplomacy tools that wish to help to create 
a better image of Russia in American public opinion along with facilitating the 
advancement of Russian business and other interests in the United States.  As discussed 
above, soft power and public diplomacy are designed and undertaken with the hope that a 
state will be able to attract key actors in other countries to want what it wants.  This 
attractiveness is made all the more difficult when consistent negative biases are believed to 
exist in the media of the targeted countries.  Certainly, no state has the responsibility to 
openly allow a foreign state to attempt to persuade their citizens to act in the interest of that 
foreign state.  However, overcoming this perceived bias is central to the aims of the 
Russian government in producing the American RBTH supplements.  As stated above, the 
RBTH mission, according to its website, is to foster “balancОН anН proПОssional 
intОrnational НialoРuО” anН to covОr storiОs about Russia “that are usually not covered by 
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foreign media for their domestic audiences.”157  A primary research question for this thesis 
involves how the RBTH supplements attempt to challenge these perceived media biases 
and stereotypes. 
 The issue of bias toward Russia within the American press has been studied and 
allegedly confirmed in a variety of different academic articles and studies, which the 
Russian government points to in order to show bias in the American media. 158   In 
Katchanovski and MorlОв’s stuНв, ͞The PolitiĐs of U.“. TeleǀisioŶ Coǀeƌage of Post-
Communist Countries,” tСО autСors ОбaminОН the television news broadcasts on ABC, 
CBS, and NBC about Russia Пrom 1998 to 2009.  TСОв concluНОН tСat tСОsО “broaНcasts… 
were dominated by negative stories, such as tense relations with the United states, crime 
anН criminals, spвinР anН sОcrОt sОrvicОs, anН unНОmocratic НОvОlopmОnts in Russia.”159  
They also founН tСat “nОаlв invОntОН stОrОotвpОs tСat associatО Russia аitС children 
adopted in the United States, mail-order brides, sex slaves, and oligarcСs” аОrО Пar morО 
prevalent in the broadcasts than traditional images of “voНka anН alcoСolism, colН climatО 
and Siberia, bОars, anН Russian roulОttО.”160  This is significant because it means that the 
stereotypes about Russia are evolving and becoming related to hot button issues between 
the two countries. 
 In AnНrОi TsвРankov’s articlО “BlaminР Moscow,” he studied the history and 
inПluОncО oП tСО “tСО Anti-Russian Lobby” in American politics and foreign-policy 
planning in relation to the U.S. reaction to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008.  He later 
expanded this research into a larger book on the subject titled Russophobia: Anti-Russian 
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Lobby and American Foreign Policy.161  In the article, he argues that “besides feeding to 
the general public the highly distorted image of Russia as a power that is relentlessly 
autocratic, has no regard for civilian life, and is interested only in restoring its domination 
in the Caucasus, the anti-Russian groups have contributed to a hardening of official US 
policв on Russia.”162  Although Tsygankov did not conduct an empirical study of the 
“lobbв” or its activitiОs pОr sО, Сis conclusions support the findings of other studies that did 
conduct such research.  Similarly, Anatol LiОvОn’s articlО “AРainst RussopСobia,” details 
the actions and manifestations of Russophobic forces within America, and similarly he 
applies it to a study of media representations.163 
 Public opinion polls show that the prevailing perception of Russia among the 
general population prior to the Ukrainian crisis was fairly mixed, although still largely 
negative.  In a PОа RОsОarcС CОntОr “Global AttituНОs & TrОnНs” poll, tСО responses from 
Americans about Russia were generally favorable (those that answered "very favorable" 
and "somewhat favorable") with the numbers rising from 42% in 2007 to 49% in 2012.164  
While during the same period, those in the US population with an unfavorable (those that 
answered "very unfavorable" and "somewhat unfavorable") view of Russia rose between 
35% in 2007 and 40% in 2012.165  These numbers indicate that more Americas were 
inclined to express a positive opinion of Russia before the Ukrainian crisis, yet there was 
still a sizeable group with views that were unfavorable towards Russia.  In the 2014 poll, 
Americans with a generally favorable opinion of Russia fell dramatically to 19%, while 
those with a generally unfavorable opinion of Russia shot up to 72%.166   
 Regardless of the opinions of the American public or the actual level of alleged 
bias in the American media, the existence of a perception of bias in the American media by 
the Russian government is relatively clear.  It is this perception that is important to this 
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thesis, because this perception of bias by the Russian government lies behind the mission 
and goals of RBTH and some of its sister organizations.  As a result, this thesis argues that 
the tone and content of RBTH are more often than not meant to combat this perceived bias. 
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4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 As a result of my theoretical approach and empirical background research I posit 
eight points for establishing the basis of my analysis:  (1) that the soft power and public 
diplomacy cultivation activities of the Russian Federation are a joint venture undertaken by 
the government of the Russian Federation through both official government agencies and 
government-owned media operations and think tanks;  (2) this joint venture is 
accomplished in a variety of ways including through the use of supplements in major 
foreign newspapers; (3) that RBTH is a manifestation of this joint venture; (4) RBTH 
hopes to engage with the readers of the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and the New 
York Times in a familiar manner; (5) there is a consistent bias toward Russia in the 
American media, and RBTH is a part of the Russian response to this by challenging the 
prevailing narrative; (6) 2014 was a particularly difficult year for the advancement of 
Russian soft power in the United States of America due to the crisis in Ukraine; (7) that 
effective soft power/public diplomacy cultivation involves more than just politics or 
media-bias correction activities; and (8) the basis of a successful, media-based soft 
power/public diplomacy cultivation strategy, such as RBTH, is credibility, which results 
from a mix of factors including criticism of the sponsoring government engaging in the 
activity. 
 Consequently, several research questions arise and the answers to them drawn from 
the available evidence form the basis of my thesis.  What is the nature of the content 
produced for RBTH?  How has this changed over time?  How does RBTH deal with the 
Ukrainian crisis?  Does RBTH remain credible as described above? 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
 
The probing of my research questions will be carried out through a combination of 
a quantitative content analysis and a qualitative analysis.  The two aspects will work 
together in order to be able to identify areas of interest for the producers of RBTH and the 
frequency and prominence of their appearance over time, and to analyze trends in these 
data points.  Furthermore, the tone employed and strategies used by the authors will be 
identified, codified, and ultimately analyzed in a similar manner to the areas of interest 
mentioned above. 
 
 
5.1 METHODS 
 
 At the heart of the analysis will be a quantitative content analysis.  At the heart of a 
quantitative content analysis is the ability to manage and analyze a large amount of 
unstructured data over a period of time.167  In my research, I will use the quantitative 
content analysis in two ways.  The first aspect will be a straightforward coding system that 
will allow for the general information of an article to be systematically catalogued.  The 
information that will be gathered from this process will be to find for each article these 
criteria: (1) the date; (2) the genre; (3) the publication that it appears in [WSJ, WP, NYT]; 
(4) the author; (5) the length; (6) the location within the supplement [what page]; (7) the 
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prominence of the article on the page(i.e. whether it is the main article on the page; a 
secondary article on the page, which usually means in the center of the page below the 
primary article; or an article on the periphery of the page) ; (8) whether the article is 
accompanied by a photograph, cartoon, information graphic (e.g. a poll, a graph or chart, 
or a brief mini-article relating to the main article), or some combination of these items; and 
(9) whether the article ПОaturОН in a “tОasОr” on tСО Пront paРО.   
The content of the article will then be assessed by a variety of means.  In order to 
do this, I will use a modified version of a qualitative analysis similar to the grounded 
theory proposed by Anselm Strauss.  By that, I mean that I will conduct a short analysis of 
each article and identify the key areas of interest for my study and go through the process 
of developing a coding structure along the way according to the open coding method 
proposed by Strauss.168  I have adopted this open coding structure because of the unknown 
aspect of the specific content that is contained within the RBTH supplements.  Before my 
research began, the topics that RBTH would discuss were largely unknown in the 
beginning of the research, thus the coding needed to be able to grow and expand as a result 
of the changing nature of the RBTH supplements.   
The coding structure for this falls into the following general categories: (10) 
geographical framing of the article (described further in the following chapter); (11) the 
specific topic addressed in the article (described further in the following chapter); (12) the 
primary framing of the article [what is the general focus of the article in relatively broad 
categories] (described further in the following chapter); (13) I determined the general 
approach of the author to the primary framing of the article as determined in (12) as being 
positive, critical {negative}, or neutral; the next step was then to analyze what the author 
was either positive or negative about [for neutral no further determination was made], if 
the article was deemed positive in (13) then, it would be coded in category (14); if the 
article was deemed critical {negative} in (13) then, it would be coded in category (15); 
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(16-18) follows the same criteria as (13-15) except with relation to a secondary framing 
topic if there was a topic that warranted its own individual assessment [i.e. having 
considerable influence on the meaning and purpose of the article that is separate from the 
primary meaning] (19-21) follows the same pattern as the (13-15) and (16-18) except with 
relation to a tertiary framing topic [again only if necessary and substantially different from 
both the primary and secondary framing].  In the final step (22), I determined the strategic 
framing of the article based off of my own assessment of the tone and content of the article 
[more than one assessment in this category was possible].  These strategies will be 
discussed in greater detail in the Results and Analysis chapter. 
During the open coding process, I routinely corrected, added, merged ideas, 
renamed codes, and modified the coding structure in accorНancО аitС Strauss’s tСОorв oП 
open coding. 169   In addition, after all the coding was done, I performed one final 
consolidation effort in order to clarify my findings and make them more digestible. After 
the process of coding was complete, I was able to run a comprehensive content analysis of 
the data that I had coded. 
 I usОН tСО onlinО contОnt analвsis soПtаarО “Dedoose” to pОrПorm tСО coНinР as 
well as the analysis, which was supplemented by the use of Microsoft Excel. 
 
 
5.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 As with any methodology, there are of course limitations.  Klaus Krippendorff 
identifies two general limitations with the idea of content analysis.  First, a problem arise 
with the fact that a content analysis requires a large data set in order to be viable.170  In the 
case of my research design, I have a substantial data set of nearly 450 pieces of data that 
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allows me to make certain judgments and conclusions on trends.  Second, Krippendorff 
states that the replicability of the content analysis can be a cause for concern.171  This is of 
course a concern with any content analysis and mine is no exception.  Although content 
analyses claim to be objective, they are subjective in many ways.  Regarding my particular 
research design, the decision-making process involved in the open coding process is the 
result of my own interpretations of the articles.  However, this is unavoidable, as I am an 
intrinsically involved in the entire process.  There are some aspects like the date, location, 
author, etc., however, that are indisputable and allow for the maintenance of a certain level 
of objectivity. 
 These criticisms of the process are not unique to content analysis, open coding or 
qualitative analysis.  All research involves at least some level of the researcher being 
involved in making decisions that could possibly alter the eventual findings of the study.  
At least with content analysis, there is a credible attempt at limiting the levels of 
subjectivity involved in the research process.  I would argue that the systematic nature of 
my methodology gives an added sense of credibility to the process.  While some 
subjectivity is inevitable, I argue that the combined nature of my approach allows for this 
subjectivity to be discounted in terms of the qualitative aspects, due to the fact that they 
will also face the structure of a content analysis as described above. 
 
 
5.3 SOURCE OF THE DATA 
 
 As discussed thoroughly above, RBTH is a clear attempt at soft power/public 
diplomacy cultivation on the part of the Russian Federation.  Its nature has also been 
thoroughly discussed.  There are very few academic studies about RBTH, and none that 
examine its publishing activity during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. 
                                                     
171
 Ibid. 
55 
 
This study is limited to the inserts that were published in the print editions of the 
Washington Post (WP), the New York Times (NYT) and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 
during the calendar year of 2014.  The reasoning behind this decision has been discussed 
above in the Empirical Background chapter.  These supplements are supposed to be 
published on a regular, monthly schedule, however, for reasons unknown, they have 
appeared irregularly.  During 2014, 18 supplements were published in these three 
newspapers, 6 in NYT, 7 in WP and 5 in WSJ.  No supplements were published in January, 
July or August in any of the supplements.  Every other month had at least one supplement 
published in an American newspaper.  See the Appendix A for a full list. 
Every article published in each supplement is included in this assessment, including 
stand-alone information graphics or other pieces of a miscellaneous nature.  The length of 
the RBTH supplement for NYT and WSJ are 8 pages long, while WP supplements are only 
6 pages long.  As stated above in the Empirical Background chapter, the layout and style of 
each edition is associated with the layout and style of the partner newspaper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
 
 
6. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
6.1 RESULTS 
 
GENERAL DATA 
 To begin, I will provide an overview of the general data on the articles analyzed.  
The total number of pieces of data came to 449.  The breakdown of these by category is as 
follows. 
(2) Genre 
 
Figure 1: Number of Appearances by Type 
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EacС oП tСОsО catОРoriОs brОaks Нoаn in tСis mannОr: a “РОnОral articlО” is anв stanНarН 
journalistic articlО oП substantivО siгО; an “intОrviОа” is simplв an intОrviОа that is 
rОportОН in a quОstion anН ansаОr Пormat; an “opinion” articlО is anв article that is marked 
as an “opinion”, “viОаpoint”  or otСОr siРniПiОr, anН/or tСat ОбprОssОs tСО privatО viОаs oП 
an inНiviНual; a “nОаs briОП” is anв sСort articlО tСat proviНОs onlв a СОaНlinО or sСort tОбt 
on a specific subject, and typically labeled witС tСО СОaНlinО “nОаs briОП” or “nОаs in 
briОП” but also sСort blurbs about cultural ОvОnts can also Пit into tСis catОРorв; a “stanН-
alone information РrapСic” is an itОm tСat is not НirОctlв attacСОН to a larРОr articlО sucС as 
a poll, tСО “RBTH Пor KiНs” sОction oП tСО NВT, a “СОaНlinО quotО” in WSJ, a travОl 
advertisement in the form of an information РrapСic, or a mini articlО; a “book rОviОа” is 
quite simply a book review; tСО “otСОr” НОПinition relates to a variety of pieces that are 
either of insignificant number or of an insignificant content nature, which included cooking 
articles, letters to the editor, letters from the editor, or short teasers for online materials. 
(3) Publication Accompanied 
 
Figure 2: Publication Accompanied 
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(4) Authorship 
The overwhelming majority of articles were written by RBTH journalists or freelance 
journalists hired by RBTH, as its website claimed.  The importance and nature of the other 
authors will be made more clear in a later section about the results of this research. 
 
Figure 3: Authorship by Data Piece Count 
(5) Length of Article 
 
Figure 4: Length of Data 
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A long article consisted of over 500 words; a medium article had between 300 and 499 
words; a short article consisted of between 100 and 299 words, and a short note was 99 
words or less (typically a news brief or info graphic). 
 
FRAMING OF ARTICLES 
 
(10) Geographic Framing of Articles 
The overwhelming majority of articles involve a geographical framing that is either in 
Russia or involves an issue between Russia and the United States. 
 
Figure 5: Geographic Framing (Total) 
 
For the other categories of geographic framing, there were exactly 100 pieces of data.  The 
break down for this group is as follows: 
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Figure 6: Geographical Overview (Other) 
 
As is clear from the data, RBTH is focused primarily on what is happening in Russia (49% 
oП total) anН аСat is СappОninР bОtаООn Russia anН tСО US (29% oП total).  TСО “otСОr” 
category has a large chunk devoted to the US, but this framing is a distance third compared 
to the two main categories (just 7%).  At just 7% of total data pieces, the Ukrainian crisis is 
also given only a cursory look, and even that is primarily dedicated to the geopolitical 
situation involving multiple actors, which accounts for about 5% of the grand total leaving 
actual only 2% for Ukraine itself. 
As a result of these findings, I will provide a brief analysis of the two main 
framings (“In Russia” anН “bОtаООn Russia anН tСО UnitОН StatОs”).  The geographic 
framing of each article also provides us with a variety of other data points to compare with 
the framing of content and with that of the strategies and tactics. 
The general layout for tСО “in Russia” Нata piОcОs was as follows: 
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Figure 7: “In Russia” by Publication  
 
Figure 8: Style Of “In Russia” (Primary Framing) 
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For tСО “bОtаООn Russia and the United States” Нata piОcОs the general layout was:  
 
Figure 9: Between Russia and the United States by Publication 
 
Figure 10: Style of "Between Russia and US" (Primary Framing) 
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ПocusОН morО on tСО “bОtаООn Russia anН tСО US” minНsОt, аСilО WSJ is ПocusОН morО 
directly on what is happening in Russia. It is important to remember that for certain 
months a supplement was not published by its respective newspaper, so that can account 
for the falls to 0 in most cases in these charts now and perhaps in the future as well, when 
seen over the course of time with a large enough dataset. 
(12) Primary content 
The total number of data relating to the main primary coding categories are: 
 
 
Figure 11: Primary Framing by Category 
 
Economics and culture dominate the primary framing of articles.  This makes sense for two 
main reasons.  First, Russia has a strong cultural past that is attractive to the American 
public.  Second, WSJ is a business newspaper, and the supplement for NYT is designated 
as a part of the business section, although the NYT may not account for nearly as much of 
the economics-focused items as the WSJ, as we see with the chart below: 
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Figure 12: Total Primary Framing Values by Category and Publication 
 
With this chart we see that news about economics is by far and away the most important 
thing to WSJ.  However, some of this can be accounted for due to the large number of 
“NОаs BriОПs” that are short articles.  TСОrО arО manв morО oП tСОsО “NОаs BriОПs” in tСО 
WSJ (between 15-20) as opposed to NYT or WP which both have about 2-4 in each 
edition.  As for the other two, they have a relatively similar mix of categories. To look 
more closОlв at tСis, СОrО is Сoа ОacС nОаspapОr’s primarв contОnt looks bв catОРorв anН 
date: 
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Figure 13: NYT Primary Content By Category and Date 
*NB the spike in “OtСОr” articlОs in OctobОr is tСО rОsult oП a 2 paРО ОбposО on tСО Russian 
space program. 
 
Figure 14: WSJ Primary Content By Category and Date 
*NB TСО rОlativО spikО in “OtСОr” in FОbruarв anН to a lОssОr ОбtОnt April аas SocСi 
coverage.  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
March May September October November December
NYT Primary Content By Category and Date
Politics Culture History Economics Ukraine Other
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
February April June September November
WSJ Primary Content By Category and Date
Politics Culture History Economics Ukraine Other
66 
 
 Figure 15: WSJ Primary Content By Category and Date 
 
These charts show us that the primary content of articles is fairly constant in each edition.  
The supplements published in NYT are primarily targeted towards culture with politics and 
economics added to the mix.  The WSJ supplements are primarily focused on economics, 
with a few political articles in each one, along with the occasional section on sports.  The 
WP seems to be comprised of a fair mix of different articles from nearly every category.  
Culture is still primarilв Нominant, but politics anН “otСОr” СavО a Пair sСoаinР, аith 
economics being more prominent at different points.  Notably, the WP discusses Ukraine 
as the primary framing reference the most out of the three papers, with 8 articles about it, 
while NYT had 2 and WSJ had 0. 
Beyond the scope of the primary topic as a category, we have to look at how these topics 
were discussed.  In this section, I will present data on how each category was discussed by 
each newspaper.  However, for those areas that are underrepresented I will not provide a 
graph for that category (i.e. history and Ukraine). 
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Politics 
 
Figure 16: NYT Style Framing for Primary Framing  in Politics 
 
Figure 17: WSJ Style Framing for Primary Framing in Politics 
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Figure 18: WP Style Framing for Primary Framing in Politics 
 
The primary style framing is slightly different for each section.  All three have similar 
sample sizes.  The NYT is fairly even across the spectrum and thus the editors of its RBHT 
supplement seem to wish to present a balanced political outlook.  The WSJ has mainly 
neutral or possibly positive political views.  Again this is consistent with a supplement that 
аants to ОnРaРО its rОaНОrs in a motto oП “businОss not politics” (morО to comО bОloа on 
this subject).  The WP presents a different picture.  Here the supplements take a position 
consistently and remain neutral on only a few topics. 
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Culture 
 
Figure 19: NYT Style Framing for Primary Framing in Culture 
 
Figure 20: WSJ Style Framing for Primary Framing in Culture 
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Figure 21: WP Style Framing for Primary Framing in Culture 
 
From these graphs, we see that for the most part each supplement is generally quite 
positive about culture.  Both the NYT (63) and the WP (48) have relatively large sample 
sizes compared to WSJ (8).  However, for all of them, the evidence is clear.  Positivity 
about culture is good for soft power cultivation, which is fairly obvious.  There is little 
backlash to praisinР ОitСОr onО’s oаn or tСО otСОr’s culturО (morО bОloа on this in the 
strategy section). 
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Economics 
 
Figure 22: NYT Style Framing for Primary Framing in Economics 
Figure 23: WSJ Style Framing for Primary Framing in Economics 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
March May September October November December Total
NYT Style Framing for Primary Framing in Economics
Critical Neutral Positive
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
February April June September November Total
WSJ Style Framing for Primary Framing in 
Economics
Critical Neutral Positive
72 
 
 
Figure 24: WSJ Style Framing for Primary Framing in Economics 
 
For economics, the data set situation is now reversed.  WSJ had 110 items from the 
supplements devoted to economic news, while NYT had 20 and WP had 14.  NYT had a 
mix of style framings from each category again.  The WSJ had a clear majority that 
fluctuates between positive and neutral (55 and 29 respectively), yet there was a clear 
critical trend (26 total) that would suggest that the designers of the supplement wished to 
establish some credibility by including criticism oП cОrtain aspОcts oП Russia’s Оconomв. 
WP has very few articles about economics but they are generally positive or neutral (April 
only had one economics article and it was also tСО WP supplОmОnt’s onlв critical framing 
during the study). 
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Other 
*NB “OtСОr” incluНОs piОcОs oП Нata labОlОН sports, sciОncО anН tОcСnoloРв, ОНucation, and 
an oriРinal otСОr catОРorв tСat ПОaturОН ОvОrвtСinР ОlsО tСat НiНn’t bОlonР to onО oП tСО 
other categories. 
 
Figure 25: NYT Style Framing for Primary Framing in Other 
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Figure 26: WSJ Style Framing for Primary Framing in Other 
 
Figure 27: WP Style Framing for Primary Framing in Other 
The sample size for these is again fairly small, but each one shows that positive messages 
are preferred in RBTH. 
Secondary Framing 
The data set is considerably smaller for the secondary framing (120) to that of the primary 
framing (407).  The general makeup of this group is as follows: 
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Figure 28: Secondary Framing by Categories 
As this chart shows the break up is fairly even among the categories, with politics and 
Ukraine ranking the highest.  However, the low number of data piece makes it undesirable 
to expand and analyze the data in as much detail as before.  Instead, I will present a general 
overview of the style of the articles in each publication as a whole, instead of in a month 
by month fashion. 
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Figure 31: Style for Secondary                   Figure 32: Style for Secondary  
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As we can see from these graphs, the secondary framing of an article is typically a place to 
express criticism.  TСis is inНicativО oП a tactic tСat I СavО НubbОН “aННrОss anН rОНirОct.”  
In this tactic, the article expresses briefly in its opening lines a variety of issues or 
criticisms about something that is only slightly related to the main topic of the article.  For 
example, an article might begin by stating a few facts about the 2011-12 opposition 
protests in Russia and their suppression and dispersion.  The article would briefly make 
mention that this is a troubling thing for Russia.  However, it would then switch topics and 
state something innocuous or positive that would then become the main focal point of the 
rest of the article.   
This simple misdirection is one of the primary ways that RBTH attempts to remain 
credible with its audience.  They understand that most Americans will have heard 
something about the problems that face Russia.  They also understand a principle of soft 
power that Nye explained simply as this, “prОacСinР at foreigners is not the best way to 
convОrt tСОm.”172  This statement is at the heart of RBTH’s stratОРв.  WСОn onО reads 
enough of these articles (as I have) he begins to get the sense that behind the scenes 
someone is utterly frustrated that the readers do not understand the situation as they do, 
and that they would love simply to just explain it bluntly to them.  However, they 
diligently wait and continue to play a long game by using strategies such as “address and 
redirect” and others dicussed below. 
The final point that should be made about these charts is that the large number of 
WSJ pieces about the Ukrainian Crisis are typically the result of another strategy; the 
situation in  Ukraine is presented as bad for business.  This is the foremost strategy 
employed in WSJ for discussions about Ukraine and the sanctions.  There will be more 
about this a little later. 
 
                                                     
172
 NǇe, ͞PuďliĐ DiploŵaĐǇ aŶd “oft Poǁeƌ,͟ ϭϬϯ. 
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Tertiary Framing 
The data set for the tertiary framing (23) is very smaller than for the secondary framing.  
As a result, I will only provide a pie chart of the different categories: 
 
Figure 35: Tertiary Framing by Category 
 
Again, the tertiary framing is typically a place that a small topic would be discussed and it 
would result in the use of “address and redirect.”  Because of the nature and length of a 
newspaper article, these mentions were usually appearing only in the largest of articles and 
warranted only a few sentences within them. 
 
AUTHORSHIP AND GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION 
 
The main thing to take into account regarding authors beyond the fact that the vast 
majority of pieces are written by staff at RBTH or freelancers working directly for RBTH, 
is that with respect to the United States, RBTH is careful with its criticism, which makes 
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perfect sense since it is trying to communicate to an American audience.  When they do 
criticize the US directly without any qualifiers (i.e. both the West and Russia are to blame, 
etc.), the author tends to be American, or at least an American is central to the criticism.  
There were only five articles that were primarily targeted at the United States.  Out of 
those five, American academics/thinktankers constituted three of the authors.  The other 
two were a scathing interview with Oliver Stone, where he condemns the US and praises 
Russia, and an article written by an RBTH journalist that was critical of the outgoing 
ambassador to Russia, who he claims made very few friends during his time in Russia.   
On the other side, there are eight articles primarily critical of only Russia, and 20 
that are primarily critical of the Russian economy.  However, this is not to say that there is 
no criticism of the United States.  The difference is that this is contained in a collective 
criticism.  There are 32 articles that are primarily critical of the United States and others, 
including Russia.  In this case, there is a rather equal distribution of authors between a 
journalists from RBTH and an academic/thinktankers from the US or Russia.  In the end, it 
is smart not to criticize the target country unless you have cover by way of an author from 
that country or that the target country is merely a part of a larger problem. 
 
 
6.2 STRATEGIES 
 
As discussed briefly above, RBTH uses a variety of strategies to accomplish its mission of 
persuasion.  Some are positive and some are negative.  I will give a brief description of the 
main strategies and their usage.  (NB: an article can use more than one strategy and as a 
result these categories can share articles.  In addition, not all articles were coded with a 
strategy, for a variety of reasons such as they were too short, lacked substance, etc.) 
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“Improving Relations with China” 
This strategy involves the basic idea of showing that sanctions and worsening ties will only 
lead Russia to grow closer to China, which it is perfectly happy to do.  There were 18 total 
articles that employed this strategy and 16 of them were in WSJ, 2 in NYT and none in 
WP.  In addition, this strategy increased over time. (NB: WSJ and NYT did not publish an 
October edition). 
 
Figure 36: "Improving Relations with China" by Date 
 
“Internal Russian Politics” 
This category includes any discussions about internal Russian politics.  Topics include 
articles about how the Russian Opposition was disorganized, how the Russian public 
supports the Russian government on Ukraine, and other articles about how Russians are 
united.  There were only seven articles that employed this strategy (3 in WSJ and NYT 
each and 1 in WP). 
 
“Business not Politics” 
This is a straightforward category that simply tries to make the point that business is 
business and politics is politics.  This strategy was employed 9 times (8 in WSJ and 1 in 
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NYT).  This strategy was also the general focus of the November WSJ supplement which 
featured 6 uses of this strategy. 
 
“Promoting cooperation” 
This category argues for greater levels of cooperation and includes tactics like 
“cooperation is key to success”; “we must end divisions”; “cross-cultural cooperation and 
education is highly needed!”; and “war is not the answer” (peace through cooperation).  
This strategy was employed 7 times (5 in WP and 2 in NYT).  All of these happened in 
September (1), October (2), and November (4).  This was one of the central themes for the 
November WP supplement. 
 
“Russia is not so different from the West” 
This category attempts to target common ground between Russia and the United States.  
This can be focused on pointing to positive similarities in terms of politics, culture, etc.  Or 
it can bО a littlО morО nОРativО in naturО, sucС as “ОvОrвonО СatОs tОrrorists/Islamic 
ОбtrОmists so lОt’s fight them together!”  This code was used 36 times and the following 
graph will help to show how it was used. 
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Figure 37: “Russia is not so different from the West” by Publication and Month 
 
“Americans and Russians are different” 
Vexingly this category takes the opposite tactic as the previous one.  This category focuses 
on things like religious differences, that America and Russia are opposites in terms of 
culture, religion, and/or politics; and differences of opinion: "we see things differently 
from you".  TСis catОРorв sООms to bО НОvotОН to ОбplaininР аСв аО Нon’t unНОrstanН 
each other, while the previous one could go hand in hand with the strategy of promoting 
cooperation.  This strategy was used considerably less than the cooperation and similarities 
strategies discussed above.  It was only used 4 times. Once in the April WP, and then once 
in the May, October, and November supplements of NYT.  
 
“Highlighting American and Russian ties/history/ friendly relations” 
This category is one of the central categories for RBTH.  It focuses on promoting all of the 
successful experiences between Russia and the United States.  This includes things like 
successful US-Russia Cooperation, explaining how Russians love American things (i.e. 
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culture, food, etc.), and highlighting Russian culture in America.  This strategy was used 
the most out of any strategy (91 times). 
 
Figure 38: "Highlighting Russian-American Ties" by Publication and Month 
 
“The Russian government is a force for good in the world and within Russia” 
 This category is another rather large category and is designed as part of the heart of 
selling Russia to America.  This category talks about things like the environment being 
equally important to Russia; how gender equality and human rights are also important to 
Russians; how Russia makes scientific advances; how Russia battles global problems like 
Ebola.  In addition, the positive nature of internal Russian progress is discussed by arguing 
tСat “аО arО makinР РrОat striНОs in” (for example) Russian Civil Society, which is 
healthy; coming to terms with the past; and the tolerance of other cultures.  This category 
was used 24 times primarily in NYT (13) and WP (10).  This also became a consistent 
focal point beginning in May and continuing through to November. 
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“Russia is Modern/Modernizing/Globalized/Economically Friendly” 
This category is also a large part of attracting Americans to Russia, and in particular, 
business-inclined Americans.  This category includes things like: approving 
of/highlighting clever Russian business tactics; arguing that independent competitors exist 
in Russia; Russia is more than just a producer of energy; Russia is globalized; Russia is 
making international business easier; Russia is combating corruption; Russia is an 
economic force to be reckoned with; Russians have influence and purchasing power in the 
US economy; Russia can and does compete with the West; Russia can take the economic 
fight to America; human rights progress is good for business; in Russia renewable energy 
is also important.  Although this was not a focal point in WP (only 2 uses), NYT featured it 
10 times and WSJ featured it 23 times.  It was featured consistently throughout the year. 
 
“Russia is still cooperating with the world despite sanctions/tensions” 
In a similar manner to some of the earlier strategies, this strategy attempts to drive home 
the point that Russia is still focused on business regardless of the political atmosphere.  
This category also argues the point that there's still money to be made despite sanctions 
and the on-going crisis in Ukraine. This was primarily used by the WSJ (11) times with 
only 2 uses each for WP and NYT.  It was one of the focal points for the June and 
September WSJ editions, featuring 4 articles employing this strategy each month. 
 
“We have a lot to offer” 
This category is another central strategy to cultivate favorable opinion toward Russia.  This 
catОРorв incluНОs tСО various attОmpts bв RBTH to promotО Russia’s culturО, sciОncО, 
technology, sports, etc. which RBTH believes will bring Russia into a more positive light.  
In addition, this category also includes items that are meant to improve Americans’ 
knowledge of Russian culture etc. by teaching the readers about the Russian language and 
history as well as providing a children’s sОction “RBTH Пor KiНs” in NВT аСicС tОacСОs 
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children about the language, culture, and important people from Russian history. This 
strategy has been employed more than all the strategies, on 73 occasions.  The NYT 
supplement employs this strategy as a focal point for its entire edition with 43 uses of this 
strategy.  WP also employs this strategy heavily with 25 uses.  WSJ only used it 5 times.  
This makes sense due to the cultural focus of both the NYT and WP supplements. 
 
Figure 39: "We have a lot to offer" by Publication and Month 
 
“Historical challenge/explanation” 
This category also tends to try to teach the reader more about Russia.  However, this 
strategy tends to be a bit more pontifical, but is fairly appealing to anyone with a history 
background as it attempts and typically succeeds at providing a nuanced view of history 
from both sides of an issue.  It typically tends to favor the Russian interpretation of history, 
but this makes sense because it can be assumed that the reader more than likely already 
understands the American/Western version.  A main issue in these articles is explaining 
how the Ukrainian Crisis was a long time coming.  This strategy was used most heavily in 
the WP with 9 uses, including 3 in April that attempted to explain the Ukrainian crisis and 
the annexation of Crimea.  The NYT supplement also used this 4 times, but never as 
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concentrated.  Interestingly, but not surprising, the WSJ supplement of RBTH never used 
this strategy. 
 
“Ukraine Needs Us” 
In this category, the authors attempt to highlight the closeness that they claim exist 
between Russia and Ukraine.  This category is the main way of justifying the Ukrainian 
crisis and the annexation of Crimea, apart from the previous strategy.  This category 
includes the sub-categories that can be summed up in the following phrases: “Ukraine 
wants special treatment from us still”; “there is a humanitarian crisis Eastern Ukraine”; 
“Russia wants to work with Ukraine”; “Russia is able to help in Crimea or other areas that 
desperately need its help by providing finances and stability.”  Because of the dual political 
and economic nature of this category the RBTH supplements in WP and WSJ both 
employed it 4 times while it was only employed once in the NYT. 
 
“Ukraine is Geopolitical” 
This strategy argues that the crisis in Ukraine is strictly a geopolitical crisis.  Sub-strategies 
include: “the US doesn't actually care about Ukraine. It is actually interested in financial 
gain” anН “America is interested in Ukraine for energy supremacy in Europe.”  This 
strategy was a relatively late edition with one article in NYT in October, then one article 
each in WSJ and NYT in November, and a final article in December in NYT. 
 
“Accusatory/ Negative/Critical towards the West/NATO/EU/America” 
This strategy calls out tСО WОst’s allОРОН rОsponsibilitв Пor various problОms.  Sub-
stratОРiОs incluНО: “the West does not understand what is going on”; “the West is not so 
great”; “NATO started it”; “Edward Snowden”; the US could bully businesses in 
America”; “the West НoОsn’t аant to РОt alonР аitС us”; “US overreach”; “the West is 
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escalating tensions”; “the US and EU are running counter to the market”; “the EU backs 
out of economic negotiations”; and “Russia is crackinР Нoаn on ПorОiРn mОННlinР.”  
Despite the wide range of possible uses of this strategy, it was only used 16 times (8 in 
WSJ, 5 in WP, 3 in NYT).  Again this is not a terrible surprise, as criticism of the intended 
audience is less than productive in this environment. 
 
“Media Criticism” 
This strategy is critical of US/Western media bias.  In addition, it is critical of black and 
white reporting.  Despite the aforementioned studies confirming the existence of media 
bias toward Russia in the US, this was only pointed out 4 times (3 in WP and 1 in NYT). 
 
“The US and EU aren't playing by the Rules” 
This strategy attempts to claim that Russia is trying to play by the rules established by the 
US anН EU, but tСat tСО US anН EU аon’t abiНО bв tСОm.  TСis catОРorв also claims tСat 
the sanctions against Russia are illegal.  This strategy was employed primarily in 
supplements to WSJ (9 times) with 3 in the WP and 1 in NYT versions of RBTH. 
 
“Americans don't know much about Russia” 
This strategy is primarily focused on combatting stereotypes and other misconceptions that 
people in the United States have about Russia.  This strategy was used 6 times with 3 in 
WP, 2 in NYT, and once in WSJ. 
 
“Sanctions could/do have an effect on America/Americans” 
This strategy is focused on how the sanctions could be bad for America (or the West).  In 
addition this category likes to reassert the point that Russia has also imposed sanctions on 
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the US/EU.  Moreover, this category attempts to argue that sanctions hurt 
cooperation/progress, including in space.  This strategy was primarily employed in the 
WSJ (10 times) and with increasing frequency later in the year.  The NYT supplement 
used it 5 times while that for WP only used it twice. 
 
“Why do you want to keep hurting us?” 
This strategy is focused on the deterioration of the Russian economy during the latter part 
of 2014.  A key component of this is the fact that many Russians believe that the sanctions 
are meant to hurt Russia(ns).  This strategy was only used 3 times and only in the NYT.  
However, it was concentrated in November and December, and thus could possibly 
continue into 2015. 
 
“Russia can survive sanctions/outlast the West” 
This strategy argues that Russia is resilient and essentially that Russians can cope with 
hardships, but can the West also cope with hardships?  This strategy was used 14 times 
with half of the uses being in WSJ.  The June supplement of WSJ had this strategy as a 
focal point.  This strategy was also used in NYT as a focal point for the September edition, 
which constituted  3 of its 4 uses in that month. 
 
“Ukrainian crisis/sanctions are bad for business” 
TСis stratОРв is cОntral to RBTH’s rОsponsО to tСО sanctions.  It СiРСliРСts a variОtв oП 
different ways that Russia and the West could be making money, building relationships, 
Оtc. iП it аasn’t Пor tСОsО pОskв sanctions.  For the WSJ (24), and to a lesser extent NYT 
(8), this was a focal point for most of the year.  As the chart below shows, both used this as 
a central focal point for one or more issues.  In the case of WSJ, this strategy was the 
central focal point in 3 of the last 4 issues of the supplement for 2014.  (NB: This strategy 
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was never used in WP which is therefore omitted from the following graph.)
 
Figure 40: "Ukrainian Crisis is Bad for Business" by Publication and Month 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 RBTH engages with the American people on a variety of different topics, using a 
variОtв oП НiППОrОnt tactics anН stratОРiОs to attОmpt to “attract” tСО AmОrican pОoplО 
toward having a more favorable opinion of the government of the Russian Federation, the 
people of Russia, the businesses of Russia and the culture of Russia.  Through my 
research, I have found that in general RBTH uses a systematic approach to the production 
of its supplements.  Each supplement is structured and designed with the reader in mind, 
and it consistently provides the reader with coherent articles on topics of potential interest.  
RBTH employs a variety of strategies that aim to provoke and entice the reader into 
understanding more about the Russian mindset.   
In addition, RBTH is specifically designed to engage with an elite demographic.  
This strategy is at the core of the RBTH mission, and its own website even makes mention 
of it.  In this capacity, RBTH is a rather unique part of the Russian soft power/public 
diplomacy arsenal.  Many oП tСО otСОr aspОcts oП Russia’s soПt poаОr/public Нiplomacв 
that are focused on media are often meant to flood the media with a multitude of stories 
that attempt to alter public perception by sheer force of size and abundance (e.g. RT, 
Rossiya Segodnya).  HoаОvОr, RBTH proviНОs a vОrв НiППОrОnt аОapon to Russia’s soПt 
power/public diplomacy arsenal due to its intended audience and the effectiveness with 
which its articles are able to mimic the journalistic integrity of the parent newspapers that 
are connected to its publication.  As such, I argue that continued study of RBTH is vital to 
understanding this new, more nuanced feature of Russian soft power/public diplomacy. 
The use of negative strategies runs somewhat counter to prevailing theories of 
production of effective soft power/public diplomacy cultivation techniques, but in the case 
of RBTH, they appear to be justified for two main reasons.  First, the chaotic and volatile 
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nature of the time when the supplements were published deemed it somewhat necessary to 
expose harsh truths and provide frank words on touchy subjects (i.e. Ukraine).  Second, 
these negative strategies add a sense of legitimacy to the supplements for the reader.  Quite 
frankly, anything written about Russian-US relations in the context of 2014 without at least 
some degree of confrontation would have seemed totally out of touch with reality.  
Tensions were high and relations were getting worse.  To ignore this and pretend that all 
was well would have been disingenuous, and it certainly would have cost the supplements 
a significant amount of their credibility. 
Beyond the negative aspects of part of the strategy, the pointed nature of each 
edition of the supplements to its specific audience is shown clearly in the strategies 
employed.  In an overall sense, each edition tended to have a theme, which it wished to 
portray.  Each theme would change from one edition to the next as situations in the real 
world changed.  For example, the early editions of 2014 (especially for the WSJ) were 
relatively subdued about the international sanctions.  They typically took the attitude that 
sanctions are an inconvenience, but Russians and Americans will work around them 
because, after all, business must go on.  However, as the Russian economy began to 
seriously struggle in the second half of 2014, RBTH’s attituНО toаarН tСО sanctions 
changed dramatically.  By the last quarter of the year, the supplements had taken on an 
almost pleading tone.  However, at the same time they each remained resiliently optimistic 
(if not subtly so) about the future prospects of cooperation despite the sanctions. 
Despite the intentions of RBTH and other forms of soft power cultivation that are 
undertaken by the Russian government, the actual acquisition of soft power by Russia 
remains largely out of reach.  As discussed in the empirical background chapter, opinion 
polls show a sharp decline in favorable opinions of Russia among the U.S. population 
during 2014. 173  In addition, the content of the RBTH supplements also mirrors this new 
reality.  As discussed above, the general themes and underlying strategies employed by 
RBTH changed over time and became more pleading in its tone as the year came to a 
close.  Regardless of the nature and quality of a soft power cultivation device like RTBH, 
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unpopular policies and actions undertaken by a country will quickly and irrevocably end 
any soft power capital that the country might have previously gained.  
 However, the RBTH supplements still reach large numbers of intelligent and 
influential Americans, with about half of these people reading at least some of the articles.  
As shown in the polling data of readers mentioned in the empirical background chapter, 
those who do engage with RBTH find that the articles are thoughtful, well-written.  
Although these articles are produced with the expressed intention of influencing and 
attracting the reader to something that is probably foreign to them, they do not reflect any 
sinister intentions or other ominous dangers on the surface.  Instead, these supplements 
focus primarily on creating a stronger human bond between the peoples and businesses of 
two of the most powerful states on earth, which have been locked in a fiercely competitive 
struggle for supremacy against one another for much of the last century.  Regardless of the 
currently perceived dominance of the United States of America and the currently perceived 
isolation and weakness of the Russian Federation, the study of the machinations of the 
Russian Federation in terms of gaining larger popular support for its interests around the 
world (especially within the United States) is of vital importance.  If the Russian 
Federation wishes to successfully influence policies of current foreign adversaries, then the 
aims and methods of RBTH and similar strategies will be the most important parts of this 
success, based largely on the elite demographic that they wish to engage through these 
efforts.  As a result, further studies of RBTH are needed in order to fully understand what 
message the Russian Federation is trying to convey to this audience and whether it is 
successful in the delivery of this message.   
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APPENDIX  
 
1. LIST OF RBTH SUPPLEMENTS ANALYZED 
Newspaper Published Within Date 
Wall Street Journal February 1, 2014 
Washington Post February 5, 2014 
Washington Post March 5, 2014 
New York Times March 28, 2014 
Washington Post April 2, 2014 
Wall Street Journal April 5, 2014 
New York Times May 21, 2014 
Washington Post June 4, 2014 
Wall Street Journal June 7, 2014 
Washington Post September 3, 2014 
New York Times September 17, 2014 
Wall Street Journal September 26, 2014 
Washington Post October 1, 2014 
New York Times October 15, 2014 
Washington Post November 5, 2014 
New York Times November 19, 2014 
Wall Street Journal November 29, 2014 
New York Times December 17, 2014 
 
